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ABSTRACT
Political scientists have conducted much work examining a court’s decision on the merits
of a case. We have concluded that ideology has a strong influence on the outcome on the merits
of a decision. Furthermore, courts seek to render a decision that is closest to their own policy
preferences. However, federal circuit courts within the judicial hierarchy are constrained by
other actors according to the strategic model. There is an abundance of evidence showing that
superior actors constrain courts’ ideological preferences when such courts render decisions on
the merits. However, there is a dearth of scholarship regarding judicial decision making on
threshold issues. I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by transforming
their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary. They achieve this goal by

controlling the type of litigants who gain access to the courts by deciding cases on threshold
grounds. I also argue that federal circuit courts are responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology
because Congress has power to control threshold issues through various mechanisms. I seek to
establish that the grounds upon which a case is dismissed -- jurisdictional, justiciable, and
procedural -- defines the parameters that constrain federal circuit courts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Setting the Judicial Agenda

The U.S. Supreme Court possesses an almost entirely discretionary docket whereby the
justices choose which appeals will be reviewed. Losing parties may file a writ of certiorari
asking the Court to hear their case; while the Court receives approximately 9,000 writs a year, it
grants only about one percent of them. Political scientists argue that justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court use the writ of certiorari as a mechanism to control the Court’s docket and set the judicial
agenda (Boucher and Segal 1995; Caldeira et al. 1999; Baird 2007). Legal scholars argue that the
Supreme Court renders certiorari decisions based on legal considerations such as Rule 10 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides grounds to grant certiorari if a conflict exists among
lower courts or if an important legal question is presented (see Perry 1991). However, other
scholars have shown that justices cast certiorari votes primarily on ideological and strategic
grounds, indicating that agenda control is largely based on personal policy preferences (see Segal
and Spaeth 1993, 2002; Boucher and Segal 1995; and Caldeira et al. 1999).
Alternatively, federal circuit courts have mandatory jurisdiction over appeals from
federal district courts, therefore making it more difficult for circuit courts to set their own
agendas. Yet, lower federal courts do have a mechanism whereby they can deny an appellant’s
request to review a claim on its merits: they can dismiss a case on a threshold issue. Threshold
issues are matters that a court must decide before it hears the merits of a litigant’s claim. Such
issues include procedural rules, jurisdictional questions, and issues of justiciability. Procedural
rules primarily govern the discovery and pleading stage of litigation. Jurisdictional questions
govern whether Congress has given federal courts the power to adjudicate the claim. Justiciable
issues address whether the litigant’s claim is viable for adjudication. Constitutionally, federal
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courts’ power to adjudicate cases is limited to justiciable issues. Although the appellate
jurisdiction of federal circuit courts is mandatory, circuit courts use threshold issues as a
discretionary mechanism to control the type of litigants that can appeal the merits of an adverse
decision and the type of claims that courts can render decisions on the merits. I study federal
circuit courts because these courts serve as the final court of adjudication for the vast majority of
appellants. Since the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only one percent of cases, federal circuit
courts have an enormous influence on shaping the federal judicial agenda.
The impact of decisions on threshold issues is important because a court can prevent a
party from litigating the merits of a claim. In certain instances, a court will dismiss a litigant’s
claim seeking relief with prejudice, permanently barring that party from litigating the merits of
their particular claim. Decisions on these issues can thus prevent a court from ever rendering a
decision on the merits of the claim and, accordingly, a litigant from ever obtaining redress for his
or her grievances. Furthermore, if a court refuses to hear the claim, a litigant is without recourse
in the judicial system. As a result, the implications of a court declining to reach the merits of a
litigant’s claim are immense because a litigant will never have his or her “day in court.” The
impact of a negative decision on a threshold issue is fatal not only for the litigant, but also for
similarly situated litigants. If courts bar certain types of litigants from bringing lawsuits on the
merits by ruling against those litigants based on a threshold issue, courts can effectively shape
policy by discouraging and preventing potential plaintiffs from bringing similar lawsuits. Courts
can therefore discourage litigation from entire classes of plaintiffs and/or types of claims.
To further understand the grave consequences of decisions rendered on threshold
grounds, anecdotal evidence is instructive. For example, in Warth v. Seldin (1975), the Supreme
Court decided a case where the petitioners sought an injunction of a city’s ordinance that had the
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effect of excluding low to moderate-income families from residing in a town. The Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision divided primarily on ideological lines, held that a non-profit
organization, taxpayers, and low-income residents lacked standing to bring their suit pursuant to
the Fair Housing Act, thus dismissing it completely. Because the Supreme Court held that the
petitioners lacked standing to sue the town, this had the effect of barring low-income individuals
from even filing a lawsuit seeking affordable housing within the town. Not only did the Court
fail to address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, but the decision also bars similarly situated
litigants from filing a lawsuit seeking affordable housing. Accordingly, this case had the
substantive effect of barring other plaintiffs with similar grievances from gaining access to the
courts.
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), the Supreme Court held that the Defenders of
Wildlife, an environmental group, lacked standing to sue the federal government seeking
enforcement of an endangered species act. The vote in Lujan was divided largely on ideological
lines, with the conservative justices joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, and the more
liberal Justices O’Connor, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting. Protection for the environment is
primarily viewed as a liberal issue, while conservatives have not been its chief promoters. Lujan
had the effect of barring plaintiffs seeking enforcement of similar environmental regulations and
discouraging plaintiffs with similar interests from filing a lawsuit seeking enforcement.
More recently, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007), the Court
held that the State of Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA. In EPA, various states and
municipalities sued the EPA seeking enforcement of standards regulating emissions of carbon
dioxide from automobiles. Because the State of Massachusetts argued that it had standing to
compel the EPA to enforce environmental regulations, we would expect that the liberal justices
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would confer standing, while the conservative justices would deny standing to enforce such
regulations. The justices’ ideological preferences can explain the 5-4 vote. As anticipated,
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter, as the Court’s liberals, joined Justice Steven’s opinion.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy, as the Court’s median justice, joined the liberal justices of the
court. The conservatives of the Court, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, and Chief Justice
Roberts, dissented on the grounds that Massachusetts lacked standing. The liberals of the Court
were able to gain a majority to render a pro-environmental decision. Unlike the decision in
Lujan, the liberals of the Court in EPA were able to gain a majority to render a proenvironmental decision which expanded access to plaintiffs seeking enforcement of EPA
regulations. Because the Court held that the State of Massachusetts had standing, other states
now have the ability to file a lawsuit seeking enforcement.
Issues regarding access are also evident in cases involving procedural rules. In Bowles v.
Russell (2007), the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that a convicted defendant was barred
from appealing his sentence on the grounds that his appeal was untimely filed, despite the fact
that the district court provided him with an incorrect date. The district court inexplicably gave
the defendant, who was sentenced to fifteen years to life imprisonment for murder, a date for
filing a notice of appeal that was beyond the time prescribed by statute and the Federal Rules.
The court held that it had no equitable powers to extend the time for filing the notice of appeal.
One would expect that the conservative justices would rule against the convicted and the liberal
justices would rule in favor. As expected, the conservative justices, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas, Alito, Scalia, and the median justice Kennedy, comprised of the majority, while
liberal justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens dissented. Bowles also illustrates the grave
consequences of an appellate court dismissing an appeal on threshold grounds. Because the
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lower court dismissed the appeal, Bowles can never challenge the district court’s decision
determining that his sentence did not violate the Constitution in an appellate court. Even though
the law may clearly entitle Bowles to relief, he will never obtain that relief because the Court has
held that his appeal was untimely. However, the aforementioned cases only provide anecdotal
evidence of courts using threshold issues to bar certain litigants from gaining access to the
courts.
I present a theory explicating how federal circuit courts use threshold issues to set their
judicial agendas by dismissing cases on threshold grounds. I argue that federal circuit courts
decide cases on threshold grounds to further their own policy preferences. I also argue that
federal circuit courts are responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology because Congress has the
power to control threshold issues through various mechanisms. In this chapter, I first discuss the
literature regarding attitudinal and strategic theories of judicial decision making and how these
theories apply to decisions in the federal court system. I then discuss how the institutional
constraint of increasingly large caseloads of the federal circuits may impact decisions to dismiss
on threshold grounds. Last, I discuss my theory explaining how circuit courts control their
agendas by dismissing appeals on threshold grounds. I end by providing a brief overview of the
remaining chapters.
1.2

Theoretical Foundations
1.2.1

Theories of Judicial Decision Making

Political scientists have provided well-documented evidence of the effects of ideology on
judicial outcomes. The attitudinal model, the predominate theory of judicial decision-making in
political science, states that justices of the Supreme Court decide cases according to their
personal policy preferences without constraint from Congress or the president (Segal and Spaeth
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1993, 2002). Proponents of the attitudinal model state that justices are free to decide cases
according to their ideological preferences because justices are appointed for lifetime tenure,
generally have no other ambition to seek higher office, and have little political accountability.
However, scholars find evidence that place the tenets of the attitudinal model into doubt
at least to the extent that justices consider other things in addition to their personal preferences.
The strategic model of judicial decision making argues that justices do not solely vote their
sincere policy preferences, but seek to maximize their policy preferences in view of the
preferences of other players (Epstein and Knight 1998; Spiller and Gely 1992). In particular, this
model provides that justices of the Supreme Court cast their votes in view of Congress’s power
to override their decisions and, therefore, justices make strategic choices in order to maximize
their policy preferences in view of any possible retaliation from external political actors (Epstein
and Knight 1998). This also model provides that justices craft opinions considering the
preferences of other justices in order to gain a majority vote (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
1999; 2000).
Walter Murphy (1964) was among the first pioneers to recognize that the justices of the
Supreme Court do not decide cases unencumbered. He argued that the Court has political
constraints of which it must be aware, including the president’s power to ignore a decision of the
Court by not enforcing it and his power to nominate jurists who share his ideology. Testing the
strategic model has always been somewhat problematic, as it is difficult to distinguish strategic
considerations from sincere preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Baum 1978). However, there
have been several attempts to test the validity of this theory through what are known as
separation-of-powers models. Building upon Murphy’s work, scholars provide a more nuanced
theory considering subsequent scholarship explaining the interaction between the political
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branches of government and the Supreme Court. Among these is Eskridge (1991b) who builds
on Murphy’s qualitative analysis. In a formal model named the Court/Congress/President game,
Eskridge states the Court must be cognizant of the Congressional committee whose jurisdiction
governs the requisite subject matter, Congress if the bill goes to the floor, and the President as he
has the power to veto legislation. Because the Court is aware of this game, Eskridge states, the
Court seeks to maximize its policy preferences while also adopting a policy that will not risk
retaliation by these other actors (Eskridge 1991b). While Eskridge finds Congressional
committees relevant, Spiller and Gely (1992) argue that the Court seeks to place its decision
between the preferences of the House and Senate. They also find that the Court responds to
interest groups that are likely to lobby Members of Congressional committees. Ferejohn and
Weingast (1992b) continue to modify previous separation-of-powers games by asserting that the
Court, acting as a sophisticated honest agent, considers the policies of the current Congress by
interpreting a statutory provision on the ideal point of the chamber that is closest to the Court’s
own precedent, which is the status quo. King (2007) also finds evidence supporting the strategic
model. He finds that the Supreme Court decides cases raising issues involving statutory
interpretation on constitutional grounds rather than statutory grounds when circumstances are
favorable for a Congressional override. Therefore, the threat of a Congressional override is a
check against a majority’s unfettered power to use its own policy preferences. Also, Spiller and
Gely (1992) find that the Supreme Court crafts its opinions considering Congressional
preferences regarding decisions involving the National Labor Relations Board.
Much of the scholarship examining the strategic model focuses on the U.S. Supreme
Court. However, scholars have also studied the effects of strategic decision making within
federal circuit courts. In particular, scholars have studied whether circuit courts are responsive to
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changes in Congressional ideology. In examining cases involving health and safety issues,
Revesz (2001) finds no evidence of DC Circuit judges’ acting in response to changes in the party
of the president or in Congress. Hume (2009) also finds no evidence that circuit panels consider
Congress’s ideological preferences when deciding cases challenging the reasonableness of an
agency’s decision. Although, Cross (2007) finds no evidence that circuit courts are responsive to
changes in the liberal filibuster-veto point in Congress, he finds evidence that circuit courts do
respond to changes in the conservative filibuster-veto point.
Although scholars do not agree on the influence of Congressional preferences on circuit
court decisions, circuit courts have another principal to whom they must respond: The U.S.
Supreme Court. Songer et al. (1994) find that circuit court panels both follow Supreme Court
mandates (responsiveness) and modify decisions in conformity with the Supreme Court
(congruence). Interestingly, Cross (2007) finds that circuit courts follow Supreme Court
precedent from prior Courts rather than the current Court. However, Klein and Hume (2003) find
that circuit courts are not responsive to Supreme Court preferences based on the evidence that
circuit courts are not more likely to decide “certiorari worthy” cases consistent with Supreme
Court preferences. This evidence indicates that circuit courts do not seek to shelter themselves
from reversal.
In addition to considering the preferences of outside actors, circuit courts must be
cognizant of the preferences of their colleagues sitting on their court. Circuit courts are unique
insofar as judges who sit on those courts render decisions in three-judge panels. Public law
scholars have studied the impact of decision making in this context, providing a theory called
panel effects. The theory of panel effects provides that a judge’s colleagues sitting on a panel
influences that judge’s vote (Cross 2007). Empirical evidence provides support for this theory.
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Cross and Tiller (1998) find evidence that DC Circuit Court judges who sat on panels with a
judge appointed by the opposition party (split panels) were more likely to vote according to the
preferences of the opposition-party judge than judges who sat on panels who were all appointed
by members of the same party (unified panels). Beyond ideology, Kastellec (2013) finds that the
presence of an African American judge sitting on a panel increases the likelihood of the panel
upholding an affirmative action policy.
District court judges behave in a similarly ideological fashion as other judges who sit on
the federal bench (Rowland and Carp 1996). Regarding their place in the judicial hierarchy,
circuit courts are less likely to reverse a district court’s decision on the merits when the judge’s
preferences are consistent with the panel’s preferences (Haire et al. 2003). Moreover, Randazzo
et al. (2006) finds that district court judges constrain their ideological preferences when they
anticipate a negative response from a circuit court. Furthermore, as the ideological distance
between the district judge and the circuit panel increases, the likelihood of reversal also
increases. We know that district court judges have an interest in seeking a higher office and, as a
result, seek to protect their professional reputation by minimizing the number of reversals (Klein
and Hume 2003).
1.2.2

Theories of Judicial Decision Making and Agenda Control

While considerable scholarship focuses on the extent to which justices decide cases
according to their personal policy preferences, public law scholars also argue that justices rely on
their preferences at the agenda setting stage. The Supreme Court controls access by screening
cases through certiorari review (Baird 2007). Although Rule 10 provides that the Supreme Court
may grant certiorari in cases where a conflict exists among lower courts or an important legal
question is presented, this procedural rule exerts little constraint on a majority that seeks to

10

implement its own policy preferences. Even more, justices have proactively used this Rule to
further their own policy goals. For example, Ulmer (1972) was among the first to determine that
justices use certiorari to further their own agendas, finding that justices grant certiorari in cases
they want to reverse. A few years later, Baum (1978) found that justices grant the writ when a
lower court decision significantly departs from their own ideological preferences.
Later researchers have also supplied evidence that courts use certiorari to further their
own ideological preferences. Brenner and Krol (1989) find that justices who voted to grant
certiorari are more likely to reverse than affirm the lower court decision at the merits stage.
Perry’s (1991) qualitative research shows that justices act strategically by defensively denying
certiorari when that justice’s preferred position is unlikely to prevail at the merits stage. Since the
Court has a tendency to reverse cases it grants certiorari, justices are cautious in casting certiorari
votes because of the risk of establishing precedent that is incongruent with their policy
preferences. Perry’s research also shows that justices “aggressively grant” certiorari in cases they
believe would not only prevail on the merits, but also further ideologically congruent legal
doctrine or overrule unfavorable precedent. Caldeira et al. (1999) provide empirical evidence
supporting Perry’s qualitative findings. They find evidence of both “aggressive grants” and
“defensive denials.” However, Boucher and Segal (1995) find that justices vote to “aggressively
grant” certiorari in cases they seek to affirm, but do not “defensively deny” when they want to
reverse. Although certiorari is a procedural tool, the substantive implications are evident to both
litigants and members of the Court.
Recently, scholars have considered the impact of Congressional preferences on the
Supreme Court’s decisions to grant certiorari. Extending Eskridge’s theory, Epstein, Segal, and
Victor (2002) argue that the Supreme Court renders decisions to grant certiorari based on

11

Congressional preferences. They find that justices are more likely to either deny certiorari or
decide the case on constitutional grounds if believe that their preferences in statutory cases are
incongruent with Congressional preferences. Epstein et al. argue that justices of the Supreme
Court are just as attentive to Congressional preferences when deciding cases at the merits stage,
as they are attentive to those preferences at the agenda-setting stage. They further argue that
justices seek to invite less scrutiny by acting strategically at the agenda-setting stage than
inviting more attention and scrutiny at the merits stage. Extending Epstein’s et al. theory, Harvey
and Freidman (2009) argue that the Court is not as insulated as previously believed from
Congressional retaliation when it renders decisions on constitutional grounds. They find that the
Court is less likely to grant certiorari seeking to review the constitutionality of a Congressional
statute as the policy preferences of the median justice becomes farther from Congressional
preferences. That is, the Court is constrained by Congressional preferences and acts strategically
even at the certiorari stage.
1.3

Threshold Issues
Scholarship provides evidence that justices of the Supreme Court decide to cast certiorari

votes according to attitudinal and strategic considerations, but also such influences are evident in
justices’ decisions on threshold issues. Political scientists have yet to provide substantial
scholarship examining implications of ideology on threshold decisions. Of the few studies,
Rathjen and Spaeth (1979) provide evidence of the effects of ideology in cases decided on
threshold grounds. They find that justices of the Burger Court used threshold issues either as a
gatekeeping function to manage its caseload, exercise judicial restraint, or veil ideological
decision making. Although Rathjen and Spaeth examine a variety of threshold issues, the
majority of scholarship regarding such issues focuses on justiciability, and particularly standing.
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Among these is Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002), who provide summary statistics that indicate
ideological decision making in standing decisions of justices of the Supreme Court. They
surveyed cases from 1953 to 2000 that the Supreme Court questioned a litigant’s standing to sue.
They find that the Warren Court conferred standing in 68.9 percent of cases, while the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts held plaintiffs had standing in 42.7 and 38.6 percent of cases, respectively
(2002, 233). The decline from the Warren Court through the Rehnquist Court is significant.
However, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of standing in only a small number of cases.
Within the terms examined, only 174 cases within that period addressed standing. Of those 174,
the Court held that the litigant lacked standing in 90 cases.
There is also empirical work regarding the effects of threshold issues and ideology within
lower federal courts. Similar to scholarship studying the U.S. Supreme Court, much of the
scholarship studying lower federal courts is devoted to the issue of standing. Staudt (2004) finds
that both policy preferences and legal rules impact decisions in cases involving taxpayer standing
at all levels of federal courts. Pierce (1999), in examining both standing and ripeness decisions in
the federal circuit courts, finds that conservative judges are more likely to deny standing to
plaintiffs asserting environmental claims than liberal judges. Additionally, Cross (2007)
examines ideology and threshold issues in the federal circuit courts. He finds that as Congress
becomes more conservative, circuit courts are more likely to reach a conservative decision on the
threshold issue. However, Cross does not distinguish among different types of threshold issues.
Kaheny (2010) finds that federal circuit court judges are more likely to decide issues in
conformance with their own ideological preferences when deciding whether the litigant is the
proper party to bring the action. Kaheny’s scholarship is also limited insofar as she only
distinguishes threshold issues on the basis of the proper party to bring the action and the proper
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forum of the court. Fix and Randazzo (2010) employ a qualitative analysis finding support that
federal circuit courts decide cases on threshold grounds in order to avoid reaching the merits
because they desire to defer to the preferences of the president in cases involving national
security. However, their theory may be confined to cases of national security because of the dire
consequences for second-guessing the president’s judgment in this issue area.
Furthermore, there is little scholarship regarding district court decision making on
threshold issues. Rowland and Todd (1991) find that the ideology of a district court judge
impacts standing decisions. Judges who were appointed by President Reagan were slightly less
likely to confer standing to litigants classified as “underdogs” than President Carter-appointed
judges. Moreover, Braman (2006) finds experimental evidence that legally-trained participants
acting as district court judges looked to the merits of a case to ascertain their ideological
preferences when determining their decision to confer standing to a litigant. Therefore, the
evidence tends to establish that district court judges decide threshold issues in a manner that is
most congruent with their preferences on the merits of the case. Rendering a judgment on a
threshold issue as opposed to the merits of a case provides an opportunity to control the
substantive outcome without reaching the merits.
However, empirical evidence also shows that Congress seeks to control threshold issues
to produce results congruent with their own policy preferences (Lindquist and Yalof 2001).
Curry (2007), in testing the likelihood of the House passing legislation modifying diversity
jurisdiction, finds that as the workload of federal district courts and the ideological distance
between the federal judiciary and the House increase, the likelihood of Congress limiting
diversity jurisdiction increases. Smith (2006) finds that liberal Members of Congress are more
likely than conservative Members to support statutory provisions that provide a private right of
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action for environmental regulatory provisions. That is, Members change judicial procedures to
allow plaintiffs to bring suits that are ideologically congruent with their own position. Also,
Democrat-controlled committees are more likely to confer standing to such plaintiffs than
Republican-controlled committees. Additionally, Smith finds that Members of Congress are
more likely to support standing provisions when those Members are more ideologically aligned
with federal district courts. One could surmise that Members believe courts that are closer to
their ideological preferences are more likely to render decisions more favorable to their policy
position. Additionally, Frymer (2003) provides qualitative evidence that Congress gave the
federal courts authority to amend the Federal Rules of Procedure to aid plaintiffs in asserting
civil rights claims. This literature provides support that Congress is aware that threshold rules
have substantive implications and Congress amends such rules for courts to render decisions in
conformity with their preferences.
1.4

Legal Considerations
Many proponents of the attitudinal and strategic models often argue that the law exerts

little restraint on a judge’s ability to render a decision based on his or her personal policy
preferences. Nevertheless, more recent scholars find evidence that legal considerations serve as a
constraint on judges’ preferences. Tiede (2007) finds evidence that federal district court judges
changed their sentencing behavior after Congress enacted the Sentencing Guidelines.
Furthermore, Randazzo and Waterman (2006) find that judges sitting on the federal circuit courts
changed their voting behavior when Congress enacted statutes to curb their ideological
inclinations. Concerning the Supreme Court, Bailey and Maltzman (2008) find that justices are
constrained by legal doctrines such as precedent when deciding issues of the First Amendment.
Although other scholars have found evidence that legal doctrines influence decision making (see
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Epstein and Koblka 1992; George and Epstein 1992; Songer and Lindquist 1996; Corley et al.
2013). However, other scholars have found evidence that legal doctrine serves as a weak
constraint on attitudes (Howard and Segal 2004). Likewise, I argue that legal factors serve as a
weak constraint on attitudes as doctrines explicating threshold issues generally are within the
discretion of the court.
1.5

Theory
In this dissertation, I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by

transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary. They achieve
this goal by controlling the type of litigants who gain access to the courts by deciding cases on
threshold grounds. Because conservatives tend to favor business interests while liberals tend to
favor individuals litigants (Howard and Brazelton 2014 forthcoming), I argue that conservative
panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against individuals when appealing a judgment
disposing a case on threshold grounds. However, I argue that federal circuit courts are not free
to vote their sincere policy preferences. They must act strategically because Congress has the
power to constrain federal courts by enacting legislation governing threshold issues.
Consequently, federal circuit courts do not want to invite retaliation from Congress and,
therefore, curb their ability to decide threshold issues in conformance with their own policy
preferences.
Generally, Congress’s ability to override an incongruent statutory decision is piecemeal;
such change takes place one statute at a time and typically affects one issue area. In contrast,
Congress’s ability to control threshold issues is vast. A change in a threshold rule can impact a
number of issues areas. More importantly, any Congressional change in a threshold rule will
impede federal courts’ ability to set their own judicial agendas. Congress enacting a law
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modifying threshold issues is akin to Congress controlling the Supreme Court’s certiorari review
(see Boucher and Segal 1995; Caldeira et al. 1999; Baird 2007). As Epstein, Segal and Victor
(2002) argue that justices of the Supreme Court seek to invite less scrutiny by acting strategically
at the agenda-setting stage than the merits stage, I likewise argue that federal circuit courts seek
to invite less scrutiny at their agenda-setting stage than at the merits stage. I further argue that
federal circuit courts view Congressional regulation of threshold issues as a substantial threat to
their power to set their own agendas. Because they seek to invite less scrutiny, they are more
responsive to Congressional preferences regarding threshold issues than issues presented at the
merits stage. Therefore, I argue that federal circuit courts seek to maximize their policy
preferences, but act strategically because they are constrained by Congressional preferences.
I derive my theory from the literature establishing that federal courts are responsive to
Congressional preferences (Eskridge 1991b; Cross 2007). Because federal circuit courts must be
cognizant of the Judiciary Committees that act as gatekeepers for any bills seeking to modify
laws regulating the power of federal courts dismiss on threshold grounds (Eskridge 1991b), I
argue that federal circuit courts are cognizant of who sits on Congressional committees.
Accordingly, federal circuit courts act strategically by not deciding cases outside of the confines
of Congressional committee preferences. Unlike the literature that provides that federal circuit
courts generally are not responsive to Congressional preferences (Revesz 2001; Hume 2009), I
argue that federal circuit courts are very keen to Congressional preferences on threshold issues.
I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by transforming their
mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by rendering decisions on the
threshold grounds of procedure, jurisdiction, and justiciability. I delineate between these three
types of threshold issues because the degree which circuit courts are constrained depends on the
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type of threshold issue presented. Federal courts have the power to create procedural rules, but
federal courts do so subject to Congressional oversight. Congress solely controls the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, providing courts with little power to control their jurisdiction. Article III of
the Constitution provides that federal courts can only adjudicate justiciable issues. Because
justiciability is generally a constitutional question, federal courts possess discretion for deciding
which cases are justiciable. However, a subset of justiciable issues falls outside of the
requirements of the Constitution. This subset is called prudential standing. That is, federal courts
have created the common-law doctrine of prudential standing that goes beyond the requirements
of constitutionally justiciable cases. Under the doctrine of prudential standing, courts can deny
standing when a plaintiff challenges a Congressional statute. Federal courts are interpreting that
Congressional statute to determine if Congress intended to confer a private right of action under
the statute. However, Congress can confer prudential standing to the class of litigants when
courts have previously denied standing. Congress has the power to do so because federal courts
are interpreting Congressional statutory intent rather than standing pursuant to Article III.
Because Congress has some control over each type of threshold issue, I argue that federal circuit
panels act strategically to shield themselves from an adverse Congressional action.
However, I must account for an alternative theory to my main contention that federal
circuit courts use threshold issues to set their agendas. Another important institutional constraint
is the ever-increasing caseload of the federal courts. Large caseloads allow less time to address
the merits of a case. That is, large caseloads strain scarce judicial resources, which may
encourage panels to use the more expedient method of disposing cases on threshold grounds.
Scholars have noted the effects of heavy caseloads within the federal judicial system. Large
dockets create an environment where judges are overworked. Therefore, heavy caseloads lead to
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inconsistencies in the law, delay in redressing grievances and, as a result, decreased confidence
and legitimacy in the judicial system (O’Scannlian 1999). O'Scannlain (1999) finds that heavy
caseloads for the Ninth Circuit, which carries almost 20 percent of the federal docket, have
contributed to its failure to adequately resolve legal conflicts within the Circuit. Scott (2006,
341) finds that of the cases that the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari from 1985 to 2005, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit an average of 14.48 times, with the Fifth Circuit
having the next highest rate of 5.14 reversals per term. Even more, the Supreme Court reversed
many unanimous decisions appealed from the Ninth Circuit. This is compared to an average
reversal rate of about 3.5 percent of appeals from other circuit courts. These studies provide
some evidence that because the Ninth Circuit carries the largest caseload, heavy caseloads
impede that Circuit’s ability to render quality decisions and to alleviate its large caseload. The
Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate may lend support to this notion.
Not only could large caseloads impede a circuit court’s ability to render quality decisions,
large caseloads may constrain ideological decision making. For example, Hall (1985) finds that
the ideology of justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana was curbed in cases that
were appealed pursuant to that court’s mandatory jurisdiction. Because the mandatory
jurisdiction is comprised of 80 percent of that court’s caseload, justices may be inclined to gather
a consensus in order to avoid incurring the costs of crafting a dissent (1985, 253; but see Corley
et al. (2013) finding no support that decreasing caseloads allow for greater opportunity for
dissensus among justices of the Supreme Court.). Hall’s finding lends support that heavy
caseloads curb ideological voting to preserve scarce judicial resources lending support for the
notion that heavy caseloads limit scarce judicial resources. Circuit courts may not dispose of
cases on threshold ground to further their policy preferences, but may do so to provide a more
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expedient manner of disposing cases. Similarly, heavy circuit court caseloads may not only
impede ideological voting on the merits but also could encourage disposition of cases on
threshold grounds to preserve scarce judicial resources. I therefore control for the caseload of
federal circuit courts as they may be more inclined to dispose of cases on threshold grounds to
alleviate the burden of increasingly large caseloads.
1.6

Chapter Outline
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss how federal circuit courts

set their agendas by deciding cases on grounds of procedural rules to control which types of
litigants that gain access to federal courts. Federal courts have power to promulgate procedural
rules, which governs rules for filing claims and pleadings. I examine a commonly raised
procedural rule, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs sanctions for
parties and attorneys when they file claims on objectionable grounds. I show how the ideology of
the panel affects decisions to sanction parties based on whether the party is a business or an
individual litigant. However, the panel’s ability to render these decisions in conformance to their
ideology is not unfettered. Congress can override any rules promulgated by the federal courts.
Because this unique conferral of power resembles the conferral of power Congress has given to
bureaucracy agencies, I draw on bureaucracy literature to examine judicial decision making in
this context. Since Congress maintains oversight, I examine whether circuit courts are responsive
to changes in Congressional preferences. I end by discussing the consequences of the denial of
access on procedural grounds.
In Chapter 3, I examine how circuit courts control access by deciding cases on
jurisdictional grounds. Particularly, I examine decisions to certify a class in class action lawsuits.
Conservatives who are traditionally aligned with business interests are arguably more likely to
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deny class certification for plaintiffs seeking to sue businesses and corporations. As an example,
I discuss the recent Supreme Court case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes (2011), where a conservative
majority denied an entire class of plaintiffs the ability to proceed as a class to sue Wal-Mart for
discrimination on the basis of gender. I then empirically test whether conservative circuit courts
use jurisdictional issues to limit access for plaintiffs seeking class certification. I argue that
federal circuit courts seek to maintain control over jurisdictional decisions to control which
litigants can gain access to the courts through certification decisions and, therefore, set their own
judicial agendas. However, I argue that federal circuit courts are keenly aware of Congressional
preferences and seek to maximize their preferences within the confines of Congressional
preferences. I test my theory by examining whether circuit courts are responsive to changes in
Congressional ideology since Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts. I then
discuss the implications of the denial of access to the courts in certification decisions.
In Chapter 4, I discuss how circuit courts control access in decisions to grant prudential
standing. Unlike Article III standing, federal courts have further limited plaintiffs’ ability to
bring suits challenging a federal statute under the doctrine of prudential standing. If a court
denies prudential standing, Congress can later confer standing to the class of plaintiffs. I also
argue that federal circuit courts seek to control access by rendering decisions to maximize their
policy preferences within the preferences of Congress. I examine decisions to confer prudential
standing to plaintiffs seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act of 1968. This Act creates a right of
action for persons alleging discrimination in the housing market. I discuss the Supreme Court’s
decision in Warth v. Seldin (1975) to deny plaintiffs seeking redress under the Act. Using
quantitative analysis, I test theory by examining panels’ decisions to grant or deny prudential
standing to plaintiffs.
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I conclude in Chapter 5 with thoughts examining the mechanisms that circuit courts use
to set their agendas. I explore the implications of federal circuit courts using threshold issues to
control the type of litigants that gains access to the courts. I argue that my findings highlight how
circuit courts achieve this objective. I then discuss the broader implications of federal courts
denying certain litigants access to the courts. I end by discussing plans for future research in
federal and state courts’ use of threshold issues to set their judicial agendas.
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2

CHAPTER 2: IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF

THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
2.1

Introduction
In 1999, Keith Bowles was convicted in state court of murder and sentenced to fifteen

years to life imprisonment. After exhausting his appeals in state court, Bowles’s only recourse
was to file a habeas corpus petition in federal court. Bowles subsequently filed a habeas petition
and a federal district court denied his petition on the merits. After additional pleadings, the
federal district court entered an order that purportedly stated the last date for filing a notice of
appeal. However, the district court made a clerical error and provided Bowles with an incorrect
date, which was three days beyond the time stipulated by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
and by statute. Bowles filed his notice of appeal before the date provided by the district court but
after the time stipulated by the Rules. Bowles then appealed to the Sixth Circuit and that Court
dismissed Bowles’s appeal as untimely. Bowles then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
review of the Sixth Circuit’s decision dismissing his appeal as untimely.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction over
Bowles’s appeal because it lacked discretion to extend the time period for filing a notice of
appeal. All of the conservatives ruled against Bowles, stating that federal courts are without
discretion in extending the time for filing a notice of appeal as provided by statute and the
Federal Rules. The conservative majority characterized the Rule as jurisdictional and, therefore,
held that it could not modify the jurisdiction of the federal courts. However, the Court’s liberals
dissented, arguing that time standards are not jurisdictional; rather, time standards are procedural
rules devised by federal courts to conduct their business. In Justice Souter’s dissent, he argued
that the Court has power to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal especially since the
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appellant relied on the date the district court provided him. Justice Souter also stated that it is
unjust to deny Bowles’s appeal given he relied to his detriment on the date provided to him by
the district court. The split decision on ideological lines suggests that the conservatives of the
court used time standards to bar this convicted criminal defendant from appealing an adverse
decision on the merits, while the liberals sought to provide him with the opportunity to appeal
the decision.
The issues presented in this case leads to my research question: Do federal courts use
procedural rules to control the type of litigants who can gain access to the courts in order to set
their judicial agendas? The issue underlying this research question is demonstrated in the Bowles
case. A court was required to decide whether Bowles’s notice of appeal was timely filed before it
reviewed the decision of the district court denying his habeas petition. Because the Supreme
Court held that Bowles’s appeal was untimely, a federal appellate court will never review the
decision of the district court denying Bowles’s habeas petition. Consequently, the conservatives
of the Court denied Bowles access to appeal the denial of his habeas petition, while liberals
sought to grant him access. The consequences of the Bowles decision are grave as Bowles can
never challenge the constitutionality of his sentence in a federal appellate court. I discuss Bowles
as an example of the dire consequences of courts denying a litigant access based on a procedural
rule. However, cases like Bowles are not the norm in that federal courts do not ordinarily provide
litigants with the wrong deadline for filing appeals. I therefore test my theory by examining a
subset of cases of rules for filing claims that are more frequently litigated in federal courts:
circuit court decisions governing sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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In this chapter, I demonstrate that courts decide cases presenting questions of procedural
rules according to their personal policy preferences. I argue that the federal circuit courts do so to
set their judicial agendas. I specifically examine whether federal circuit courts use the Federal
Rules of Practice and Procedure to control which type of litigants gain access to the courts.
These Rules are unique insofar as Congress has delegated its authority to devise these Rules to
the federal courts pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. Drawing from the bureaucratic literature, I
set forth a theory explaining the relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary
regarding procedural issues. I then test my theory by examining circuit court cases involving
Rule 11.
2.2

The Rules Enabling Act
2.2.1

A Historical Perspective

In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act transferring power from the Attorney
General to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Practice
and Procedure. The Act states that any promulgation of the Rules cannot “abridge, modify, or
enlarge any substantial right” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Congress transferred power on the premise
that the Rules were to have no substantive implications, but were to assist federal courts in
conducting their business (Bone 1999).
In 1958, Congress transferred this rulemaking function from the Supreme Court to the
Judicial Conference of the United States. The Conference, chaired by the Chief Justice of the
United States, is comprised of chief judges of all the federal courts of appeals and a district judge
within each circuit. The district judge is elected by a majority of the judges within the circuit.
The Judicial Conference appoints Advisory Committees on the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Bankruptcy, Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence. These committees consider
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suggestions regarding changes to the Rules from the bench, bar, and members of the public. If an
advisory committee finds that a suggestion to change a rule has merit, it then drafts a proposed
rule, publishes the proposal, and submits the proposal to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure for approval. If the Standing Committee approves the proposed rule, the
proposal is published for public comment. If the Standing Committee approves the proposed rule
after a notice and comment period, it then transmits the proposal to the Judicial Conference. If
the Judicial Conference approves the proposal, the Conference submits the proposed rule to the
Supreme Court for further review. If approved, the Supreme Court must issue an order by May 1
promulgating the rule to take effect no earlier than December 1. After the Supreme Court
promulgates the rule, Congress has until December 1 to override the rule before it takes effect.
As early as 1938, the Supreme Court amended the Rules allowing plaintiffs to more
easily assert and support their claims in federal court (Frymer 2003). In particular, the discovery
requirements were liberalized allowing plaintiffs to request a substantial amount of information
from defendants to support their claims. Additional rule changes also allowed more liberal
requirements for those seeking to certify members of a class action lawsuit. These changes were
advocated by the American Bar Association to render it easier for the general public to gain
access to the courts. Although Frymer (2003) finds no qualitative evidence that the 1938
amendments were promulgated on ideological grounds, he finds that rule changes in the mid1960s and 1970s were enacted to help facilitate filing civil rights claims. As an example, Rule 53
conferred authority to special masters to enforce consent decrees between unions and civil rights
plaintiffs. As Frymer concludes, the intent and/or effect of these rule changes were substantive in
nature, creating an environment conducive to successfully litigating civil rights claims. The
Supreme Court did not amend the Rules again until it amended the Rules of Evidence in 1972.
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Congress believed that the Supreme Court exceeded its authority by creating Rules that had
substantive implications (Burbank 2004). For the first time, Congress prevented the Rules from
taking effect. Congress enacted legislation that substantially revised the Federal Rules of
Evidence (McCabe 1995).
In 1988, Congress again revised the procedure to amend the Federal Rules. One of the
changes that Congress incorporated was to open the amendment process to the public. Similar to
the notice and comment period required for rules promulgated by administrative agencies
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the goal of the notice and comment period
is to provide the public with an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process. Certain
interest groups are active in the notice and comment process as procedural rules can have
substantive implications for certain litigants (McCabe 1995). Another major reform revising the
Federal Rules was the enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. The purpose of this
Act was to streamline trials and decrease costs and delays in federal district courts (McArthur
1999). The Act required district court judges to appoint an advisory committee to promulgate
local rules and report cases that were on a court’s docket for an extended period of time.
Even more changes were proposed when Republicans gained a majority in the House in
1994 with its “Contract with America,” having tort reform as one of their top legislative
priorities. Republicans then introduced several bills seeking to modify the Federal Rules to
render it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in court. For example, Republicans introduced
legislation to change the American Rule, which provides that each party pays their own
attorney’s fees, to the English Rule which states that the losing party pays the winner’s attorney’s
fees (Rowe 1997). House Republicans were successful in passing the Attorney Accountability
Act requiring a party to pay opposing party’s attorney’s fees if that party rejected a settlement
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offer and was subsequently awarded a smaller judgment than the settlement offer. The
aforementioned legislation demonstrates that political parties recognize the substantive
implications of procedural rules and how these rules can grant or deny litigants access to federal
courts.
2.2.2

Rule 11 and Sanctions

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been subject to much political
debate. Pursuant to Rule 11, attorneys must attest to the following regarding any lawsuits filed:
“(1) [the claim] is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.”
Rule 11(b)(1)-(4), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A party may move a court to
sanction an alleged violator, whether party or attorney, if there is cause to believe that the
Rules have been violated. Additionally, a court may impose a sanction on its own
initiative if it deems that an attorney or party has violated the Rule.
In 1983, the Supreme Court amended Rule 11, removing a court’s discretion to find an
attorney or party in violation by requiring courts to impose sanctions against a noncompliant
party. The change may have been prompted by the growth of litigation due to the proliferation of
laws conferring a private right of action (Schwarzer 1994). However, the impact of the Rule
disproportionally affected plaintiffs. According to a study conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center, plaintiffs who were civil rights litigants were sanctioned at a higher rate than those who
asserted tort or contractual claims (Schwarzer 1994). Some argue that the amended Rule was a
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direct attempt to curb plaintiffs’ ability to assert substantive claims in court by limiting a
plaintiff’s ability to assert broad claims at the pleading stage (Redish and Amuluru 2005).
In 1993, the Judicial Conference sought to address some of the concerns and disparities
that arose as a result of the changes to the 1983 amendment. Particularly, the Rule was changed
to allow plaintiffs to assess the merits of claims after discovery and, therefore, giving the
attorney an opportunity to develop and revise pleadings as they discovered evidence. Some argue
that the change in this Rule created an environment that is more conducive to plaintiffs asserting
substantive rights (Redish and Amuluru 2005). The Rule provided plaintiffs more leeway to
further develop their substantive claims to conform to newly discovered evidence.
The amendment also required parties to give notice to opposing counsel when a party
filed a motion for sanctions. It provided an alleged violator with an opportunity to remedy any
objectionable conduct. The most significant amendment to Rule 11 was a provision that required
courts to sanction a party when it found them in violation of the Rule. Although the Rule
required sanctions, the drafters stated that courts could devise novel methods of sanctioning
violators including monetary or nonmonetary sanctions (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Comment to 1993 Amendment). Nonmonetary sanctions could range from finding the violator in
contempt or dismissing the violator’s case. Monetary sanctions included paying the opposing
party attorney’s fee and costs. The drafters emphasized that the purpose of the amended Rule
was to deter objectionable conduct rather than to reward the opposing party. As such, the
Comments provide that monetary fines should be paid to the opposing party only in “unusual
circumstances.” This is a change from the prior Rule, which courts routinely awarded attorney’s
fees to the opposing party when a violator was sanctioned (Schwarzer 1994).
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The 1993 changes were not well-received by the new Republican House. As previously
mentioned, they advocated sweeping tort reform in its Contract with America. In response to the
liberalization of Rule 11, they sought to amend many of changes that were made. Particularly,
they introduced legislation that required sanctions once a court found a violation as provided in
the 1983 Rules. Republicans also introduced legislation that eliminated the “safe harbor”
provision to allow attorneys to correct objectionable conduct as a remedy to a violation. House
Republicans specifically opposed the drafter’s primary purpose of deterring sanctionable actions
to compensating opposing counsel and parties by requiring the violator to pay opposing party’s
attorney’s fees and costs (Rowe 1997). Although the foregoing bills were unsuccessful, Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which required courts to make a
written finding whether any party or attorney had violated Rule 11 in a class action securities
lawsuit. Sanctions for violations are mandatory having a presumption of an award of an
attorney’s fees in certain instances. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c). President Clinton vetoed the
legislation, but Congress successfully overrode the veto. In 2004, House Republicans again
sought to amend Rule 11. They sought to change the provision to remove courts’ discretion to
impose sanctions when a party is in violation. The amendment would reinstate the provision in
the 1983 rule that required courts to sanction a party when the court finds a party in violation of
the rule (Redish and Amuluru 2005).
2.3

Congress as a Model of Control
Scholarship regarding the bureaucracy can provide insights for judicial decision making

as the two institutions have similar structures and oversight in regards to procedural rulemaking.
Just as Congress has delegated its authority to the judiciary to promulgate rules of procedure,
Congress has similarly delegated its authority to the bureaucracy to promulgate rules and

30

regulations. Because this auspicious oversight is similar, theories regarding Congressional
oversight of the bureaucracy are instructive in studying judicial decision making. I use literature
explaining bureaucratic oversight to theorize that Congress is able to curb judicial discretion
when courts apply procedural rules.
Agencies possess knowledge and expertise in their requisite areas and, therefore,
Congress delegates its legislative power to the bureaucracy to promulgate rules and regulations.
Congress, acting as the principal, imposes monitoring mechanisms to ensure that its agent, the
bureaucracy, will not stray too far from its preferences. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) present
a theory of Congressional oversight by explaining it in terms of police patrols and fire alarms.
Police patrols entail direct oversight; the principal proactively audits the agent (97). However,
oversight by a fire alarm is indirect oversight as it establishes procedures encouraging third
parties to alert the principal when the agent strays from the principal’s directives (97).
In order to limit agency loss, principals devise mechanisms to limit the discretion of an
agent (Shipan 1997, 7-8). This is important because as McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989)
show, once the policy preference is moved it is very difficult for the coalition enacting the policy
to return the policy to its original position. Shipan notes that this principle applies when a court
or an agency moves the policy. He further argues that there are actors who may prefer the new
policy to the old policy and will therefore act to impede the majority’s ability to return to the old
policy. Furthermore, bureaucratic oversight in the form of reducing budgets and enacting
legislation is costly (Balla 1998).
Scholars have argued that the most effective mechanism for oversight is implementing
procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Congress enacted the APA to establish
bureaucratic oversight without incurring the costs of direct monitoring. According to McCubbins
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et al., procedures can reduce the costs of obtaining information from the agent by equipping
requisite constituents with vested interests to monitor agencies. They further theorize that
political officials seek outcomes that are favorable to their constituents. They argue that the
Administrative Procedure Act creates an environment that simulates political pressures that
constrain agency policy making and render agencies more likely to render a decision according
to the principal’s preferences.
Agencies must provide notice of a proposed rule or regulation and a period for public
comment, publicize the proposal to solicit participation from a wide variety of interests, render
decisions based on the evidence and provide a rationalization for the decision. McCubbins et al.
further argue that these procedures curb agency discretion by making its decision-making
process public. Agencies cannot promulgate rules in secret. Also, a public rulemaking process
forces agencies to consider political interests by involving interest groups to create an
opportunity to comment. Interest groups have greater incentives to become more involved if the
proposed rule has political implications. Therefore, groups with similar interests of those in
Congress will be represented. Accordingly, those groups will provide political information for
the agency to consider. The open structure of the process allows Congress, as the principal, to
more easily acquire information. McCubbins et al. argue that agencies preferences are curbed
because agencies no longer have information advantage to render decisions that are most
favorable to the agency. Because information is public, interest groups have an incentive to
“sound the alarm” when preferences stray too far from Members of Congress or the President.
Accordingly, Congress “stack[s] the deck in favor of constituents who are the intended
beneficiaries of the bargain struck by the coalition which created the agency” (McCubbins et al.,
261).
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Bureaucratic scholars (i.e., Epstein and O’Hallaron (1994)) find empirical support for the
notion that agencies are responsive to Congressional preferences. Weingast and Moran (1983)
argue that Congress and in particular, Congressional committees, have a strong influence on
bureaucratic outcomes. According to the Congressional Dominance Theory, Congress imposes
controls, such as administrative procedures, to create an incentive for bureaucratic actors to align
themselves with Congressional preferences. Shipan (2004) finds empirical evidence that, under
certain conditions, the Food and Drug Administration renders decisions that are responsive to
Congressional preferences: as the Congressional committee becomes more liberal, the agency
becomes more activist. Likewise, as the committee becomes more conservative, the agency
becomes less activist. Agency preferences are constrained when committee preferences are
opposite of the agency.1
Just as the APA solves the problem of asymmetry of information with regards to
bureaucratic oversight, the Rules Enabling Act solves a similar problem. Congress has delegated
some of its legislative powers to the federal courts, particularly its authority to promulgate the
Rules of Practice and Procedure, just as Congress has delegated legislative powers to
bureaucracy agencies. Because Congress has delegated its authority to the federal judiciary, it
has devised a similar mechanism, the Rules Enabling Act, for Congressional oversight. The
structure of the Rules Enabling Act is similar to the APA. Both Acts have provisions that open
its rulemaking process to the public. The notice and comment period of the Rules Enabling Act
is structured so that constituents will be more likely to “sound the alarm” if the institution strays
too far from the preferences of its principal, Congress (McCubbins et al. 1987). Because
1

Scholars have debated the influence of the President versus Congress. See Woods and Waterman (1991) finding
evidence that bureaucracies are subject to both presidential and Congressional control. However, Moe (1987) that
congressional-dominance theorists ignore the role of the president and his powers as head of the executive branch
(i.e., appointment of agency heads, agency budgets, etc…).
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bureaucratic scholarship has shown that the APA acts as a constraint for bureaucratic outcomes, I
expect the Rules Enabling Act to likewise constrain judicial preferences. My expectation is
grounded on the aforementioned theories explaining bureaucratic control. Just as Congress is
able to control bureaucratic outcomes by aligning similar interests via the APA, I argue that
Congress controls judicial outcomes regarding procedural rules via the Rules Enabling Act. I
argue that federal circuit courts are particularly aware of Congressional preferences because any
adverse action can place in peril federal courts’ ability to control their judicial agendas. I also
argue that federal circuit courts are keenly aware of who sits on the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees (see Eskridge 1991b), because these committees act as gatekeepers having
jurisdiction over any bills seeking to amend the Federal Rules. Unlike statutes governing a
specific subject matter where scholars have found that circuit courts are not responsive (see
Revesz (2001); Hume (2009)), procedural rules cover all aspects of litigation. For example, Rule
11 governs all pleadings in civil litigation. Accordingly, any legislation seeking to limit or
expand the discretion of federal courts in Rule 11 sanctions applies to litigation in all practice
areas and, therefore, would substantially curb judicial discretion in all areas. Because any
retaliation from Congress can significantly hinder federal courts’ ability to control their appellate
jurisdiction, federal courts are acutely attuned to Congressional preferences. Furthermore, I do
not expect to find that circuit courts are responsive to Supreme Court preferences, as Klein and
Hume (2003) find that circuit courts are not more likely to decide “cert. worthy” cases in
conformance with Supreme Court preferences. However, I do expect to find that circuit courts
are responsive to the ideology of the Judicial Conference as it serves as a gatekeeper for
proposals seeking to amend the Federal Rules.
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2.4

Hypotheses
Judges render decisions according to their personal policy preferences. The application of

procedural rules can have ideological implications as illustrated in the discussion regarding Rule
11. Amendments to the Rule have been highly politicized with Republicans seeking to limit
plaintiffs’ claims by requiring mandatory sanctions when a violation has occurred. Galanter
(1974) argues that individuals are disadvantaged when litigating against the government and
businesses because they lack resources and incentive to create a sustained litigation strategy.
Later empirical research confirms that individuals are in fact disadvantaged (Songer and Sheehan
1992, Songer et al. 2000; Kaheny 2010). I expect that individuals are further disadvantaged when
litigating against businesses as conservatives have traditionally favored business interests
(Howard and Brazelton 2014 forthcoming). Accordingly, I expect that conservative circuit
panels will rule against individuals in decisions appealing sanctions under Rule 11. Therefore,
H1: Conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against individual
litigants in an appeal challenging a Rule 11 sanction.
Because scholarship has shown that federal courts are responsive to Members who sit on
Congressional committees (Eskridge 1991b). However, scholarship shows that agencies as well
as other actors are many times responsive not to Congress as a whole, but rather to the
committees with jurisdiction on the particular issue (Eskridge 1991b). Here, the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over bills seeking to amend the Rules, and so the
composition of these committees may influence judicial decision making. Therefore, I expect the
following:
H2a: As the ideology of the House Judiciary Committee becomes more conservative, the
individual is less likely to prevail on a Rule 11 sanction.
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H2b: As the ideology of the Senate Judiciary Committee becomes more conservative, the
individual is less likely to prevail on a Rule 11 sanction.
While these are the committees with jurisdiction over amending the Rules, the Chairs of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees act as gatekeepers for all bills introduced seeking to
amend those Rule; the Chairs thus have the power to essentially kill a bill by never scheduling it
for a hearing or markup (Oleszek 2013). As a result, the ideology of the Chair alone may
influence how judges decide Rule 11 cases. Therefore, I expect:
H3a: As the ideology of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee becomes more
conservative, individuals are less likely to win.
H3b: As the ideology of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee becomes more
conservative, individuals are less likely to win.
2.5

Data and Methods
Data for this project was collected by examining cases published in Lexis/Nexis

Academic. I coded cases from 1980 to 2005 for the First through Eleventh Federal Courts of
Appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I searched for all cases that included the term “Rule 11”
and “Civil Procedure.” The dataset includes all published and unpublished cases where a party
appealed the decision of the district court finding a violation of Rule 11 or where a party
appealed the denial of their Rule 11 motion seeking to find the opposing party in violation.
Given my interest in understanding how circuit courts treat individual plaintiffs, I included only
cases involving individuals and businesses, for an overall N of 307.
My dependent variable is whether the individual won the appeal. I coded “1” if the
individual won and “0” if the individual lost. My independent variables include the median
ideology of the circuit court panel. I used the Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper nominate scores (GHP
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scores) for this project (Giles et al. 2001). The GHP scores are an ideological measure of judges
who sit on the Federal Courts of Appeals. Giles, Hettinger and Peppers use the Poole (1998,
2009) and Rosenthal Common Space scores of the nominating Senator, considering the strong
influence of senatorial courtesy. If one home-state Senator is from the president’s party, the
Senator’s Common Space score is used. If both home-state senators are from the president’s
party, the average of the two scores is used. Finally, if the judge is from a state where there is no
Senator who is a member of the president’s party, the president’s score is used. Because there are
many vacancies on the Courts of Appeals, many of those vacancies are filled with district court
judges who sit on circuit court panels by designation. Accordingly, I used Christina Boyd’s
ideology measures of district court judges for those judges who sat by designation (Boyd 2010).
To ascertain the ideology of the district court judge, she used the method employed by Giles,
Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) and the extension by Epstein, Martin, Segal, and Westerland
(2007). Additionally, I controlled for the median ideology of the Judicial Conference using each
member’s GHP score as this Conference acts as a gatekeeper submitting recommendations for
amendments to the Rules. I controlled for the ideology of the Supreme Court by using the
median judicial common space score for the Court. I control for the ideology of the Supreme
Court because it has power to reverse decisions of circuit courts. Although some scholarship has
found that circuit court panels are not responsive to Supreme Court (Klein and Hume 2003),
other scholarship has shown that circuit courts follow Supreme Court mandates (Songer et al.
1994). I also controlled for the influence of Congress by using the median Poole and Rosenthal
Common Space scores for the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, their respective Chairs.2
I also controlled for the president as he has the power to veto legislation passed by Congress. I
2

(See Epstein et al. (2007) using a bridging method placing common space scores on the same scale; see also Bailey
and Chang (2001) using a similar method.)
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estimated a probit model because the dependent variable is dichotomous. For all independent
variables, I measured the distance of the median ideology of panel to each of the independent
variables by subtracting the absolute value of the median ideology of the panel from the absolute
value of the ideology of the requisite independent variable. Also, in this model I used robust
standard errors and clustered on the circuit to account for the possibility that residuals may not be
independent within each circuit. Therefore, my model provides as follows:
Sanction = β0 + β1 Panel Ideology + β2 Circuit Median + β3 Judicial Conference +
β4 Supreme Court + β5 House Judiciary Committee + β6 Senate Judiciary
Committee + β7 House Chair + β8 Senate Chair + β9 President + ε
2.6

Results and Discussion
The summary statistics are below in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics

Variable
Individual Winning
Panel Ideology
Circuit Median
Judicial Conference
Supreme Court
House Judiciary Cmt
Senate Judiciary Cmt
House Chair
Senate Chair
President

Mean
.375
.067
.063
.113
.145
-.030
.098
-.116
-.095
-.328

Standard Dev.
.48
.289
.182
.166
.154
.166
.163
.422
.342
.185

Minimum
0
-.532
-.385
-.290
-.188
-.405
-.274
-.449
-.470
-.715

Maximum
1
.559
.507
.530
.462
.366
.556
.659
.407
.087

Table 2.1 shows that individuals won at a rate of 38 percent, providing some evidence
that individuals are disadvantaged when litigating against businesses. Businesses have superior
resources and incentive to carry out a sustained litigation strategy. However, if judicial ideology
does not influence Rule 11 decisions, individual litigants should be equally disadvantaged when
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litigating before liberal and conservative panels. The results of the probit model testing my
theory are presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Probit Model of the Individual Winning
Table 2.2: Probit Model of the Individual Winning

Variable
Coefficient
Panel Ideology
-.854*
Circuit Median
-.433
Judicial Conference
1.721*
Supreme Court
-1.162
House Judiciary Cmt
6.444
Senate Judiciary Cmt
-4.178
House Chair
-2.161*
Senate Chair
-1.421
Constant
-.283
N=307
Log Likelihood = -190.940

Standard Error
(.299)
(.514)
(.806)
(1.005)
(3.820)
(3.005)
(.978)
(1.443)
(.324)
* = p > .05; χ 2 = 72.64*

As hypothesized, the median ideology of the panel has a statistically significant effect on
the likelihood of the panel ruling in favor of the individual when litigating against a business.
These results indicate that I can reject the null hypothesis. The results provide support that the
more conservative the panel, the less likely the panel will rule in favor of the individual.
However, probit coefficients do not provide information regarding the effects of the magnitude
of the independent variable (Zelner 2009). In order to ascertain the magnitude, I estimate the
predicted probability of the individual winning. The results of that estimation are presented in
Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by Panel
Table 2.3: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by Panel

Panel Ideology
Mean
Minimum
Maximum

Probability
.36
.57
.22

Confidence Intervals
(.33, .38)
(.41, .72)
(.15, .29)
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This estimation is constructed with a 95 percent confidence interval with all variables
except Panel Ideology held at their mean. When Panel Ideology is held at its mean, the likelihood
of the individual winning a Rule 11 appeal is 36 percent. However, when Panel Ideology is held
at its minimum, i.e., when the panel is most liberal, the likelihood of the individual winning
increases to 57 percent. When Panel Ideology is held at its maximum, i.e., when the panel is
most conservative, the probability of the individual winning decreases to 22 percent. The
confidence intervals indicate that the results of this estimation are statistically significant.
Estimating first differences, the individual is 34 percent less likely to win as the ideology of the
panel changes from minimum to maximum. The results of this estimation are depicted in Figure
2.1 below.

Figure 2.1: First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Individual Winning

Figure 2.1: First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Individual Winning
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When individuals litigate against businesses, conservatives are more likely to find that
individual litigants violated Rule 11 and are susceptible to dismiss their case on the grounds that
the claims are frivolous. The evidence suggests that conservative panels are sanctioning
individuals because of their status. This places individuals at a substantial disadvantage in the
litigation process when they litigate against businesses. Galanter’s theory provides that
individuals are disadvantaged because they often lack resources to hire better attorneys, do not
have the incentive to maintain the high costs of sustained litigation, and lack long-term goals of
shaping legal precedent to their advantage. My results provide evidence that individuals are
disadvantaged not only because of their status, but also because their status prompts ideological
decision-making that is detrimental when litigating before a conservative panel. The substantive
implications are important for individual litigants. Adverse decisions against individual litigants
prevent them from “having their day in court” because the merits of their claims are not
addressed. If conservative panels are more likely to uphold a Rule 11 sanction for individual
litigants and, therefore, prevent a court from hearing the merits of the case, then business
litigants are not only able to shape precedent, but may also deter individual litigants from filing
lawsuits in jurisdictions with conservative panels or from filing lawsuits altogether.
The hypotheses testing the effects of Congress have mixed results. First, I fail to reject
the null hypotheses regarding the effects of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The
third hypotheses regarding the Chairs of those committees also have mixed results, with no effect
found for the ideology of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. However, I do find that
as the ideological distance between the House Judiciary Committee Chair and the circuit panel
grows, the individual is less likely to win.
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Table 2.4: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by House Chair
Table 2.4: Predicted Probability of the Individual Winning by House Chair

House Chair Ideology
Median
Minimum
Maximum

Probability
.36
.76
.11

Confidence Intervals
(0.33, 0.38)
(0.46, 1.05)
(-0.04, 0.25)

The estimation of the predicted probability is presented in Table 2.4. This estimation is
also constructed with a 95 percent confidence interval with all variables except House Chair held
at their mean. When House Chair is held at its median, the likelihood of the individual winning a
Rule 11 appeal is 36 percent. However, when House Chair is held at its minimum, i.e., when the
panel is most liberal, the likelihood of the individual winning increases to 76 percent. When
Panel Ideology is held at its maximum, i.e., when the panel is most conservative, the probability
of the individual winning decreases to 11 percent. The confidence intervals indicate that the
results of the estimation holding House Chair at its median and minimum are statistically
significant, but the estimation holding House Chair at its maximum is not statistically significant.
These results may be a reflection of House Republicans’ activity in this area. House
Republicans have been introducing legislation seeking to amend Rule 11 to discourage trial
lawyers from filing claims that may be considered frivolous. If an attorney was unsure whether
their arguments are grounded in law, they would be discouraged from asserting novel arguments
on their plaintiffs’ behalf because they would not want to risk a court finding that their “novel”
arguments was in fact frivolous.
Furthermore, the Chair is a powerful gatekeeper for bills introduced. This finding lends
some support for the theory that circuit courts are responsive agents of their principal, namely
Congress. This finding also lends some support for the deck-stacking theory providing that the
Rules Enabling Act sufficiently influences the outcome of judicial decisions. Because of the
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unique provisions of the Rules Enabling Act which subject the Federal Rules of Practice and
Procedure to Congressional review and public scrutiny, circuit courts may be particularly
receptive to changes in Congressional ideology, namely the Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee, in order to prevent a Congressional action incongruent with their preferences.
2.7

Conclusion
The models provide evidence that circuit panels transform its mandatory appellate

jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by deciding procedural rules to set their judicial
agendas. The evidence provides that the ideology of the circuit panel has a significant effect on
the likelihood of a litigant’s success, depending on the litigant’s status. Particularly, conservative
panels are more likely to rule against individual litigants when appealing the grant or denial of a
Rule 11 sanction. These results have significant implications for granting litigants access to the
courts. Courts have power to dismiss a litigant’s claim as a sanction pursuant to Rule 11. In
certain instances, a court can dismiss a litigant’s claim seeking relief with prejudice, thus barring
the litigant from litigating the merits of that claim. Consequently, these issues often present an
absolute bar, preventing a court from deciding the case. Accordingly, the litigant can never
obtain redress from his or her grievances. As a result, the implications of a court declining to
reach the merits of a litigant’s claim are immense. A litigant is without recourse in the judicial
system if a court refuses to hear their claim. Because of this, a litigant’s ability to comply with
procedural rules is of the uttermost importance.
Furthermore, there is some support that circuit panels are responsive to changes in the
ideology of Congress. While circuit panels seem not to respond to Congress as a whole, the
evidence suggests that circuit panels render decisions based on the ideology of the Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee. Given that the House Judiciary Committee is likely the principal
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gatekeeper for bills seeking to amend Rule 11, these results indicate that circuit panels are
cognizant of Congress’s power to override their decisions. More broadly, these results suggest
that federal judges do take into account Congressional preferences, thus constraining their ability
to freely decide according to their sincere policy preferences.
In the next chapter, I examine whether federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by
transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by deciding
cases on jurisdictional grounds. Particularly, I examine whether federal circuit courts achieve this
goal in controlling access by rendering decisions to grant or deny motions seeking to certify a
class in civil rights class action lawsuits. I seek to demonstrate how federal courts deny
certification to control which litigants obtain access to the courts on a class-wide scale.
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3

CHAPTER 3: JURISDICTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CERTIFICATION
DECISIONS IN CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS

3.1

Introduction
In 1994, Wal-Mart hired Betty Dukes as a cashier earning a wage of $5 an hour. After

five years of no advancement, she decided to sue Wal-Mart for discrimination on the basis of her
gender. She, along with six other named plaintiffs, sued Wal-Mart as a class, alleged that WalMart discriminated against women by denying promotions and providing wages at a lower rate
than men. Wal-Mart challenged the certification of the class, alleging that their complaints did
not specifically allege the wrongs committed by Wal-Mart and that the potential class was too
large to certify. A federal district court certified the class and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court’s decision. Wal-Mart then appealed the decision certifying the class to the Supreme Court.
In a split 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that a group of women comprised of
potentially 1.5 million plaintiffs was too large to certify as a class in an employment
discrimination claim. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that the plaintiffs could not
prove that Wal-Mart had a corporate-wide policy of discrimination in pay or promotion, and that
the potential of class of 1.5 million women was too numerous to set forth a common claim of
gender discrimination needed for class certification. All of the conservatives of the Court joined
the majority opinion in favor of Wal-Mart, while the liberals of the Court dissented. In response
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes, Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and Rep. Rosa DeLauro
(D-CT) introduced the Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act of 2012 to overturn the
decision by conferring jurisdiction to the federal courts for class action lawsuits having a large
number of plaintiffs.
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The Dukes decision practically denied 1.5 million potential plaintiffs the opportunity to
gain access to the courts. The vast majority of potential plaintiffs are very unlikely to hire an
attorney to bring a discrimination claim against Wal-Mart, as they lack the time and resources to
pursue their individual claims. Therefore, most of these 1.5 million women will never obtain
even the possibility of seeking redress from the alleged discrimination committed by Wal-Mart.
This case highlights the research question I address in this chapter: Do federal courts use the
jurisdictional threshold issues to control access to the courts?
In this chapter, I theorize that federal circuit courts use class certification to control
access to the judicial system. Specifically, I argue conservative panels seek to control access by
denying potential plaintiffs class certification. Because conservatives favor business interests, I
argue that conservative panels are more likely to deny certification to potential plaintiffs.
However, courts do not decide cases in a vacuum; I argue that federal circuit courts are
responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology. Because Congress possesses the ability to expand
or restrict federal court jurisdiction, I argue that federal panels are responsive to Congressional
preferences. First, I discuss of the jurisdiction of the federal courts and class action lawsuits.
Next, I provide a review of the literature regarding the jurisdiction of the courts, and then
explicate my theory and hypotheses. Finally, I present my empirical tests, examining all
employment discrimination cases between 1980 and 2000 where circuit courts considered
motions to certify a class and permitted a class action suit to proceed.
3.2

Jurisdiction, Congress and Courts
Constitutionally, federal courts can only hear cases that arise under their jurisdiction. In

order for a federal court to adjudicate a case, a court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over
the claim. Pursuant to Article III, Congress has the power to establish, modify, remove, or add to

46

the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts but for the original jurisdiction conferred to
the Supreme Court pursuant to the Constitution. Subject-matter jurisdiction gives federal courts
power to adjudicate cases on two grounds: jurisdiction by federal question or by diversity
(Baude 2007).
Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, Congress has the power to determine the areas
of law that raise a federal question and, therefore, confers jurisdiction over those areas to the
federal courts. Recently, Congress has used its powers controlling the jurisdiction of the federal
courts that raise a federal question for political reasons. Members of Congress have introduced
bills seeking to strip the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases pertaining to the
constitutionality of the pledge of allegiance, certain abortion cases, and marriage (see MayerCesiano 2006; Miller 2009). Congress’s most recent action regarding removing federal courts’
jurisdiction is in the area of military law. In response to recent decisions by the Supreme Court,
Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006, stripping the jurisdiction of federal
courts from hearing habeas corpus petitions from enemy combatants. It responded to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) and Rasul v. Bush (2004), holding that
detainees and U.S. citizens who were held at Guantanamo Bay had a right to petition for habeas
corpus relief.
Article III also provides federal courts with power to adjudicate cases under the diversity
jurisdiction, which constitutes controversies “between Citizens of different states,” and grants
Congress the power to determine its requirements. Specifically, Congress through the Judiciary
Act of 1789 specified the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, conferring to the federal
judiciary jurisdiction over cases involving residents from different states (Baude 2007). Plaintiffs
and defendants must be domiciled in different states and they must meet the requirement for the
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amount in controversy, which is set by Congress. That is, parties can litigate claims that only
implicate a cause of action arising under state law if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction
are met. Over the years, Congress has modified the domiciliary requirements and has increased
the amount in controversy, which is presently $75,000. When a state law claim is implicated,
parties may remove the case from state court to litigate the claim in a federal court. The principle
supporting diversity jurisdiction provides that litigants have a neutral forum to litigate their state
law claims and no litigant will enjoy a “home-state advantage” by litigating against an out-ofstate party in the litigant’s home state.
3.3

Class Action Lawsuits in Federal Courts
Because Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Congress controls the

jurisdictional boundaries of class action lawsuits. Generally, federal courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate class action lawsuits if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are met or if the
plaintiff presents a claim arising under federal law. Class action lawsuits permit the consolidation
claims of all plaintiffs presenting similar claims against a defendant. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are four elements that federal courts must consider when
plaintiffs file motions seeking certification. First, the potential class must satisfy the numerosity
requirement. According to the Rule, a class may be certified if the members of the class are so
numerous that treating them as co-plaintiffs in a traditional lawsuit is impractical. Second, there
must be common questions of law and fact among members of the class. Next, the claims or
defenses of the representatives of the class action must be typical of members of the class. Last,
the representative parties of the class action lawsuit must fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class (Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P.).
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Class actions originated in courts of equity to more efficiently adjudicate a number of
similar claims. The procedural mechanism was codified as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938 shortly after the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act (Rabiej 2004). The
Supreme Court amended Rule 23 in 1966, promulgating a number of changes. First, the Rule
was amended to provide greater judicial discretion in certifying lawsuits as class actions. Prior to
this amendment, federal courts could certify class actions only if the numerosity, commonality of
law and fact, typicality of claims, and fairness of adjudication as a class action were met (See
Rule 23(a), Fed. R. Civ. Pro). The amendment to the Rule provided a catch-all provision, which
states that courts can certify a class if plaintiffs present common questions of law and fact, and if
a class action is a superior method of adjudicating claims (see Rule 23(b)(B)(3), Fed. R. Civ.
Pro). Legal scholars argue that the purpose of the amendment was to facilitate greater access to
the courts for plaintiffs who otherwise would not meet the requirements pursuant to Rule 23(a)
(Burbank 2005). The Rule was specifically amended to provide a greater opportunity for civil
rights claimants to file class action lawsuits (Frymer 2003).
While the Supreme Court amended Rule 23 to expand potential plaintiffs’ ability to bring
class action lawsuits, the Court limited access in Zahn v. International Paper Company (1973).
In Zahn, the Supreme Court held that all members of a class action lawsuit were required to meet
the amount in controversy requirement pursuant to the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. As
with the vote in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the vote was divided on ideological lines with three liberals
of the Court dissenting. Plaintiffs who did not meet the amount in controversy, which was
$10,000 at the time of Zahn, could not join the class. The impact of this decision severely limited
the plaintiffs’ ability to bring lawsuits as they were each required to file a lawsuit as an
individual plaintiff. In 1990, Congress codified the Supreme Court’s decision in Zahn. Congress
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passed with President George H.W. Bush’s signature, the Jurisdiction Improvements Act which,
in part, provided that federal courts could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction in class action
lawsuits over claims that did not meet the requirement for the amount in controversy (Murphy
1995).
Another important amendment to Rule 23 occurred in 1998, when the Supreme Court
amended the Rule to permit interlocutory appeals for decisions regarding class certifications.
Ordinarily, appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over cases appealed from a non-final
judgment. Generally, a court must decide all issues presented in order for a litigant to appeal the
judgment. Because the issue of class certification generally is a threshold issue,3 the Rules
required courts to rule on a certification motion and adjudicate the merits of a claim before a
litigant could appeal the ruling on class certification. In 1998, the Supreme Court amended the
Rules rendering rulings on class certifications interlocutory and, therefore, permitting litigants to
appeal the ruling before a decision is made on the merits of a claim (Rabiej 2004).
In 2003, the Supreme Court again amended Rule 23 permitting courts to certify a class
any time before a final judgment is rendered on the merits. Second, the Rule was amended to
allow plaintiffs to request certification of a class if there were common issues of fact. Other
amendments to the Rule did not affect certification. As a result of these amendments, plaintiffs
were aided in their ability to meet the requirements and the number of class actions grew at a fast

3

In a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, they examined motions seeking class certification in federal
district courts. According to this study, courts often rule on the merits of a case along with a determination on the
issue of class certification. In fact, the study finds that certification of a class action is a type of intermediate
procedural ruling. In its study of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 80 percent of motions to
dismiss were decided before the motion to certify. In its analysis of four federal district courts, 20 percent of motions
for summary judgment were ruled on before a certification ruling and, in one district court, 67 percent of motions for
summary judgment were ruled on before a determination on certification.
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rate. Federal courts did not take kindly to the growth of class actions. Class actions sometimes
present complex legal questions which utilize scare judicial resources (Purcell 2008). According
to a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center examining securities class action lawsuits,
class actions consume three times as many judicial resources than a traditional lawsuit (Willging
et al. 1996).
Some evidence provides that class action lawsuits were more beneficial to trial attorneys
than members of the class. Particularly, attorneys reaped the majority of the benefits of class
action litigation by incurring large attorney’s fees with little compensation remaining for the
members of the class. Empirical evidence shows that in consolidated cases, juries are more likely
to confer higher awards when there is one plaintiff who joined the lawsuit that was severely
injured (Bordens and Horowitz 1989). This provides evidence that juries are more likely to grant
higher awards to all members of a class only if there is a small number of plaintiffs who suffered
a serious injury. Some argue that class action lawsuits provide a windfall for attorneys who
collect millions of dollars in attorney’s fees while leaving members of the class with nominal
awards.
Others perceive class action lawsuits as a threat to business interests. Richard Posner, a
judge sitting on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, calls class action lawsuits “blackmail
settlements” due to a company’s potential risk of a judicial determination finding it liable for all
members of a class (Schwartz 2000, 490). Therefore, corporations would be less likely to
proceed to trial to avoid the risk of an unfavorable settlement in a class action lawsuit. Even
more, the threat of filing a lawsuit could be used as a coercive tool pressuring corporate
defendants to settle. Therefore, certifying the class is an essential step for trial attorneys. More
importantly, plaintiff’s attorneys sought to litigate in state court, where they often found a more
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favorable forum. In order to circumvent the requirements of diversity jurisdiction, attorneys
added litigants who were residents of the same state as the defendant, negating the diversity of
all litigants which is required for a court to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law
claims (Purcell 2008). When Congress conferred citizenship to corporations, they began
removing cases to federal courts for litigation that were sympathetic to their claims. Corporations
use the mechanism of removal to gain a strategic advantage in litigation. When corporations
removed cases to federal courts, plaintiffs would drop their claims anticipating an adverse
decision in federal court (Curry 2007). Congress sought to rectify the perceived problems that
arose with these lawsuits.
In 2004, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act, which modified the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts conferring multi-state class action litigation to the jurisdiction of
the federal courts regardless of the diversity of the parties subject to the litigation. Before the
Act, federal courts had power to adjudicate class action lawsuits under the normal rules
governing diversity jurisdiction, which required the named class plaintiffs and defendants to be
domiciled in different states. Furthermore, the Act confers diversity jurisdiction in class action
lawsuits where total amount in controversy is $5 million or more. Additionally, federal courts
must exercise jurisdiction over class action lawsuits where one-third or less of the members of
the class reside in the same state as the defendant, must decline jurisdiction when two-thirds or
more of the members share the defendant’s domicile, and has discretion to exercise jurisdiction
when more than one-third but less than two-third of the members are domiciled in the
defendant’s state.
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3.4

Empirical Scholarship Examining Congress, Courts and Class Action Lawsuits
Scholarship regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts has been scarce. Much of the

scholarship regarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts has focused on Congress. Congress
controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts by a number of mechanisms. First, Congress can
control the number of federal judgeships. Scholars have provided evidence that as the caseload
of the federal courts increases, Congress increases the number of judgeships to accommodate for
the increase number of cases (DeFigueiredo and Tiller 1996). Congress is also responsive to
legal constraints of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, as evidenced by limiting the courts’
diversity jurisdiction when caseload increases. Since diversity cases comprise of between 25 and
30 percent of the federal courts’ docket, Congress is aware of the demands and constrains
diversity cases place on the federal courts (Curry 2007). Historically, Congress has limited the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts instead of expanding it. This is evident, in part, by the
increases in the amount in controversy from $10,000 in 1952; $50,000 in 1988; to $75,000 in
1996 (Curry 2007). Increasing the amount in controversy limits the number of litigants who are
able to meet the requisite amount and, therefore, restricts the number of defendants who are able
to remove their case to federal court. Furthermore in 1978, a bill was introduced in the House to
eliminate the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts (Purcell 2008). Not only does Congress
modify the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, Congress has sought to eliminate the diversity
jurisdiction due to the burden that it places on federal courts. These findings indicate that
Congress is responsive to the administrative needs of the federal courts to assist the courts in
accommodating the increase in caseload.
Not only does Congress respond to administrative considerations, empirical evidence
shows that Congress uses the jurisdiction of the federal courts to achieve their political goals.
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The evidence suggests that Congress uses jurisdiction as a tool to further its policy preferences.
Scholars find that Congress increases the number of federal judgeships when Congress and the
Presidency are politically aligned (DeFigueiredo and Tiller 1996). This provides evidence that
Congress seeks to carry forth its policy goals by rendering it easier to appoint judges who are
ideologically aligned with Congressional preferences. Congressional modification of the
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is premised on Congress’s belief that ideologically
aligned judges will decide cases to conform to Congressional preferences. This evidence is also
supported by Curry’s finding (2007) in testing the likelihood of the House passing legislation
modifying diversity jurisdiction. He finds that as the workload and ideological distance between
federal district court and the House increase, the likelihood of Congress limiting diversity
jurisdiction increases. His findings indicate that Congress is seeking to limit the jurisdiction of
the federal courts when the courts’ preferences are not ideologically congruent. By conferring
power to ideologically aligned federal courts, Congress can further its political goals.
However, little scholarship examines the courts’ use of jurisdiction to further their policy
preferences. Legal scholars have provided qualitative evidence that the courts use rules regarding
class action lawsuits in order to provide more access for potential plaintiffs. Frymer (2003) uses
qualitative evidence of the federal courts’ power to use jurisdiction of the federal courts to
integrate labor unions. First, he notes that Congress created to Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to address discrimination in private companies, but failed to provide the EEOC with
enforcement power. Because the EEOC lacked power, federal courts empowered private litigants
by liberalizing class action requirements rendering it more favorable to bring a discrimination
lawsuit against employers and unions. In fact, the EEOC only filed four percent of discrimination
lawsuits against employers between 1972 and 1989 (Frymer 2003, 490; Donohue and Siegelman
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1991, 1019). The EEOC did not have cease and desist powers, so individual litigants sued for a
private right of action to enforce antidiscrimination laws against employers. During the time the
EEOC lacked enforcement power, private attorneys filed class action lawsuits using federal
statutes to enforce antidiscrimination laws.
Other scholars have conducted empirical work studying the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in the context of class action lawsuits. Fitzpatrick (2010) finds that the political affiliation
of the judge has no statistically significant effect on the probability of a district court judge
approving a higher fee award in class action settlements. However, Fitzpatrick does not test
ideology but rather simply the partisanship of the judge by determining whether the judge was
appointed by a Democratic or Republican president. Measuring partisanship instead of ideology
is problematic because partisanship provides very little variability in the independent variable.
Furthermore, Coffee and Paulovic (2007) use legal analysis examining the likelihood of class
certification by circuits to conclude that the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits render liberal
certification decisions and the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits render conservative
certification decisions. They link the variation, in part, to different standards of review in
decisions for certification. For instance, the Second Circuit reviews decisions granting
certification under an abuse of discretion standard but reviews decisions denying certification de
novo. Also, Coffee and Paulovic argue that the Ninth Circuit is more liberal regarding the
requirement that potential class members share a common question of law and fact. They also
argue that precedent of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits is most restrictive regarding
class certifications seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief, while the Second Circuit has
interpreted precedent in a more liberal fashion permitting such certifications. Coffee and
Paulovic find that over 40 percent of class actions were filed in the Second and Ninth Circuits
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which indicates that attorneys are forum shopping, providing further anecdotal evidence that
these circuits are friendly forums for those seeking class certification. The variation between
liberal and conservative interpretations of Rule 23 could account for the variation in the number
of class actions that are filed within the Courts of Appeals.4
3.5

Theory: Jurisdiction and Class Action Lawsuits
My study addresses the gap in the literature regarding federal circuit courts’ use of

jurisdictional issues to control access. Because jurisdictional threshold issues can prevent certain
litigants from accessing the courts, I argue that circuit courts use threshold issues to further their
own policy preferences. They accomplish their goals by controlling certain parties’ ability to
gain access to the courts. By controlling who can gain access, courts cannot only choose which
cases it will hear on the merits, but discourage certain litigants from filing cases if litigants find
that courts are unlikely to hear their case. Litigants want to avoid time-consuming and costly
litigation if courts are unlikely to confer jurisdiction over their claims and render a decision on
the merits. Therefore, judges can further their own policy preferences by controlling who can
gain access. They are able to do so because Congress has delegated its authority to the federal
courts to promulgate rules that implicate jurisdiction. However, unlike rules that are solely
procedural but are promulgated by the federal courts, Congress controls the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Because Congress has not conferred sole power over jurisdictional issues, such as
class certifications, federal courts are not as free to decide these cases according to their
ideological preferences. However, because of legislative action seeking to limit the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, I argue that federal circuit courts act strategically seeking to maximize their
4

Other scholars have empirically examined class actions without considering the effects of ideology (See Eisenberg
and Miller 2005 examining various methods of calculating attorney’s fee award; and Gande and Lewis 2009
examining the probability of shareholders anticipating a class action lawsuit and its effect on the requisite industry).
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policy preferences but within the confines of Congressional ideology. Circuit courts desire to do
so to retain their power to set their own judicial agendas. Therefore, I examine the extent that
federal circuit courts control their appellate jurisdiction by the grant or denial of class
certification in the area of civil rights litigation. However, I must also test the alternative theory
that circuit courts decide cases on the threshold ground of jurisdiction in order to conserve scarce
judicial resources to address heavy caseloads (Willging et al. 1996).
3.6

Hypotheses
First, the federal courts seek to control their caseload. Federal courts must resolve

disputes with increasingly large caseloads (Willging et al. 1996). One method of alleviating large
caseloads is to deny certification of a class. As class action lawsuits demand up to three times as
many judicial resources than a non-class action lawsuit, panels could deny certification in order
to preserve scarce judicial resources. Therefore, my first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: As the caseload of the circuit increases, the panel is more likely to deny a motion
seeking class certification.
Furthermore, panels could also control their appellate jurisdiction by attempting to deny
access to certain litigants on a class-wide basis. Class action lawsuits afford relief to a large
number of plaintiffs who do not have the resources, time, and/or interest in pursuing claims. As
illustrated in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, courts can employ their ideology deny access to litigants whose
position is ideologically incongruent to their own. As a result, courts can deny thousand of
litigants relief. Particularly, conservatives can deny a potential class seeking relief for an alleged
violation of civil rights by denying a motion to certify. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
H2: Conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against a litigant
seeking class certification.
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There is variation among circuit courts regarding standards of review for motions seeking
class certification. Based on Coffee and Paulovic’s (2007) analysis, conservative circuits have a
more stringent standard of review for class certifications than liberal circuits. Therefore, the
likelihood that a circuit will grant or deny a motion seeking certification depends on the ideology
of the circuit. Because these standards vary based on whether the circuit is liberal or
conservative, panels may be constrained by that circuit’s certification precedent. That is, panels
are not free to vote their sincere preferences for fear of en banc review (Clark 2009).
Accordingly, the following is my third hypothesis:
H3: Conservative circuits are more likely to deny certification to plaintiffs than liberal
circuits.
Additionally, Congress shapes the jurisdiction of the federal courts by controlling the
cases courts hear through subject-matter jurisdiction and the litigants who may appear in court
through diversity jurisdiction. Unlike procedural rules, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is
solely controlled by Congress. Because the House and Senate Judiciary Committees control
legislation seeking to modify the jurisdiction of the federal courts, I expect that
H4: As the ideology of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees become more
conservative, the class is less likely to win.
3.7

Data and Methods
Data for this project was collected by reviewing cases published in Lexis/Nexis

Academic. I coded cases from 1980 to 2000 for the First through Eleventh Federal Courts of
Appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I searched all cases that included the terms “appeal,”
“grant,” “deny,” and “vacate” within the sentence of “class certification.” The dataset includes
all cases where a party appealed the decision of the district court that granted or denied a motion
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to certify a class in an employment discrimination lawsuit. Among these cases include alleged
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age and disability. The dataset includes all published
and unpublished cases.
My dependent variable is whether the plaintiffs seeking to certify the class won the
appeal. I coded “1” if the class won and “0” if the class lost. My total N is 75 because I limit
cases to appeals challenging certification in the area of employment discrimination. My
independent variables include the caseload of the federal courts. I measure caseload as the
number of cases that are assigned per active panel for each circuit. I also include the median
ideology of the circuit court panel. As in the previous chapter, I use the Giles, Hettinger, and
Pepper nominate scores (Giles et al. 2001) to measure the ideology of circuit court judges and
the scores developed by Christina Boyd to measure district court judges for those who sat on
circuit court panels by designation (Boyd 2010). I control for the ideology of the Supreme Court
by using the median judicial common space score for the Court. I again control for the ideology
of the Supreme Court because it has power to reverse decisions of circuit courts. As stated in
Chapter 2, although some scholarship has found that circuit court panels are not responsive to
Supreme Court (Klein and Hume 2003), other scholarship has shown that circuit courts follow
Supreme Court mandates (Songer et al. 1994). I also controlled for the influence of Congress and
the president by using the median Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores for the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees, and the president.5 I use a probit model as the dependent variable
is dichotomous. Also, in this model I use robust standard errors clustered on circuit to account
for the possibility that residuals may not be independent within each circuit. Thus, the following
is my model:
5

For all of these independent variables, I measured the ideological distance of the panel from the median ideology
of the circuit, the Supreme Court, the Congressional variables, and the president.
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Certification = β0 + β1 Panel Ideology + β2 Circuit Median + β3 Supreme Court +
β4 House Judiciary Committee + β5 Senate Judiciary Committee + β6 President +
β7 Caseload + ε
3.8

Results and Discussion
The summary statistics are presented in the table below.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Table 5: Summary Statistics

Variable
Class Winning
Panel Ideology
Circuit Ideology
Supreme Court
House Jud. Cmt
Senate Jud. Cmt
President
Caseload

Mean
.28
.023
.055
.044
-.106
-.061
.241
776

Standard Dev.
.45
.234
.230
.091
.238
.150
.573
364

Minimum
0
-.532
-.52
-.106
-.277
-.221
-.532
328

Maximum
1
.459
.581
.179
.381
.180
.693
2101

The summary statistics show that the potential class won the appeal at a rate of 28
percent. That is, when a litigant appealed a judgment denying or granting certification, the
potential class won 28 percent of the time. The summary statistics provides some evidence that
classes are disadvantaged when appealing a judgment challenging certification. However,
plaintiffs seeking to certify a class should again be equally disadvantaged when litigating before
liberal and conservative panels if judges are reviewing these appeals non-ideologically. The
results of the probit model are presented in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Probit Model of the Class Winning
Table 6: Probit Model of the Class Winning

Variable
Panel Ideology
Circuit Median
Supreme Court
House Judiciary Cmt
Senate Judiciary Cmt
President
Caseload
Constant
N=78

Coefficient
.020
-1.667*
3.399*
-1.111
-2.287
-.168
.001
-1.748*
χ 2 = 16.61*

Standard Error
(.535)
(.557)
(2.015)
(2.253)
(2.937)
(.340)
(.001)
(.700)
* = p > .05

The model indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 3, which provides
evidence that the ideology of the circuit court has a statistically significant effect on the
likelihood of the potential class winning the appeal. As the median ideology of the entire circuit
becomes more conservative, the potential class seeking certification is less likely to win the
appeal. To understand the magnitude, I estimate the predicted probability of the potential class
winning the appeal. The results of that estimation are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: Predicted Probability of the Class Winning
Table 7: Predicted Probability of the Class Winning

Circuit Ideology
Mean
Minimum
Maximum

Probability
.26
.62
.06

Confidence Intervals
(0.20, 0.32)
(0.36, 0.89)
(-0.01, 0.14)

The estimation for the predicted probability of the class winning indicates that when the ideology
of the circuit is held has its mean, the class has a 26 percent probability of winning. However, the
probability significantly increases when the circuit is most liberal, where the class is 62 percent
likely to prevail on appeal. When the circuit’s ideology is most conservative, the probability of
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the class winning is 6 percent. The results indicate that the estimation holding Circuit Ideology at
its mean and minimum are statistically significant, while Circuit Ideology held at its maximum is
not statistically significant. Estimating first differences, the graph as depicted in Figure 3.1
shows that the class is less likely to win as the ideology of the circuit changes from minimum to
maximum.

Figure 2: First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Class Winning

Figure 3.1: First Differences of Panel Ideology & the Likelihood of the Class Winning
The variation of the potential class winning an appeal challenging certification may be
the result in differences in the standard of review for judgments on certifications within each
circuit. Arguably, conservative circuits set precedent constraining panels’ ability to decide
certification issues pursuant to their ideology. Therefore, a more stringent standard of review
may constrain a panel’s ideological inclinations. This may explain the failure to reject the null
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hypothesis for Hypothesis 2 as the coefficient for that hypothesis is not statistically significant.
Further analysis is needed to ascertain whether variation among the standard of review for
various circuits to explain why a potential class is less likely to win as the circuit becomes more
conservative.
Overall, these findings lend support that liberals want to grant potential class litigants
access to the courts. Arguably, liberals are devising legal rules rendering easier to grant
certification and, therefore, provide access to a larger number of plaintiffs who otherwise would
be precluded from bringing an action to court. When a potential class seeks certification in an
action against a business or corporation, the certification itself can be used as leverage prompting
a corporation to settle a case to avoid the risk of an adverse judgment which could cost
substantially more than a settlement. Therefore, liberal circuits are granting access to a large
number of plaintiffs. The ramifications are important, since litigants could be encouraged or
discouraged from bringing class actions based on the ideology of the circuit. This is supported by
evidence that in 2004, the Second and Ninth Circuits received over 40 percent of all motions
nationwide seeking class certification as these circuits are known for liberal certification
requirements (Coffee and Paulovic 2007). Attorneys may thus forum shop to increase their
chances of certification in more “friendly” circuits.
The null hypotheses for the first, second, and fourth hypotheses cannot be rejected. The
inability to reject the null hypotheses regarding the House and Senate Judiciary Committees is
not entirely incongruent with previous scholarship. Many scholars have found that the federal
courts of appeals are not responsive to changes in Congress’s ideology (See Revesz 2001; Hume
2008). Although I find that the circuit courts are responsive to changes in the ideology of the
House’s and Senate’s Judiciary Committees in my chapter examining procedural rules, I find no
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similar results regarding class certifications. Circuit courts may believe that they have shielded
themselves from potential Congressional retaliation by controlling certification decisions with
stringent or lenient standards of review. Because these standards are the creation of the federal
circuit courts via common-law, they may believe that Congress is unlikely to pose a threat.
Furthermore, Circuit courts may be more responsive to the preferences of the Supreme Court
because circuit courts control certification decisions according to that circuit’s standard of
review. The Supreme Court could render a decision establishing the standard of review for all
circuit courts. Therefore, circuit courts may be particularly attuned to Supreme Court
preferences. However, the sign for the coefficient of the ideology of the Supreme Court variable
is in the opposite direction for this explanation. As the ideology of the Supreme Court becomes
more liberal, the panel is less likely to grant certification. Consequently, more research is
necessary to understand this effect.
3.9

Conclusion
My findings provide evidence that circuit courts use threshold issues to control which

litigants gain access to the courts. Although the evidence does not provide support that panels are
controlling access via class certification, the evidence provides support that access is controlled
at the circuit level. Circuits vary in their certification decisions, with conservative circuits more
likely to deny access by ruling against class certification.
The implications for the denial of class certification are vast. As demonstrated in
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, a denial of a class certification has the potential to bar thousands of plaintiffs
from bringing their claims to court. Although plaintiffs as individuals may sue a company, the
likelihood of an individual plaintiff filing suit is low. The typical plaintiff does not have the
incentive, time, and resources to sue a business or corporation (Galanter 1974). Because of these
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disadvantages for individual litigants, the denial of class certification has the practical effects of
precluding those litigants from litigating their claims in court.
Furthermore, the evidence does not show that Congress influences certification decisions.
There is no effect for changes in Congress’s ideology on class certification. Although there has
been Congressional activity in this area, the findings are not inconsistent with previous
scholarship finding that circuit courts are nonresponsive to changes in Congress’s ideology
(Revesz 2001; Hume 2009). In this context, the evidence indicates that circuit ideology has the
greatest effect on access rather than the ideology of Congress or a circuit court panel.
In the next chapter, I examine whether federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by
transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary by deciding
cases on justiciable grounds. Particularly, I examine whether federal circuit courts achieve this
goal in controlling access by rendering decisions to grant or deny prudential standing to litigants
seeking enforcement of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. I seek to examine whether federal circuit
courts control which litigants obtain access to the courts in this regard.

65

4

CHAPTER 4: JUSTICIABLE IMPLICATIONS OF DECISIONS EXAMINING
PRUDENTIAL STANDING

4.1 Introduction
In 1962, Penfield, New York, passed a housing ordinance which allocated 98 percent of
the town’s undeveloped land to single-family dwellings, setting minimum requirements for,
among others things, lot size, floor space, and living space within each dwelling. Because of
these requirements, low to moderate income individuals were unable to find housing because of
the costs associated with building and/or purchasing such homes. Low-income plaintiffs sued,
alleging a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and arguing that the zoning ordinance had
the effect of excluding them, who were disproportionally racial and ethnic minorities, from being
able to afford housing within the town. Because the effects of the zoning ordinance rendered it
difficult for low to moderate income individuals to find affordable housing in Penfield, they had
to resort to finding affordable housing in nearby Rochester. Another class of plaintiffs, property
owners as Rochester taxpayers, also sued, arguing that the City of Rochester was forced to
provide affordable housing to individuals who could not find housing in Penfield. As a result,
Rochester’s taxpayers carried the burden of providing housing for such individuals. The last
plaintiff, a non-profit organization whose mission was to find affordable housing for its
members, also filed suit against the Town of Penfield.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin (1975) rendered a 5-4 decision along
ideological lines with the conservatives of the Court holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
The Court held that the low income plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate
that they suffered an injury from being excluded from affordable housing, and not just a
generalized injury to all similarly situated low-income persons. Rochester taxpayers also lacked
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prudential standing because Congress had not specifically conferred to those plaintiffs a private
right of action pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, and because the relief they sought was not
within the “zone of interest” of protection Congress intended pursuant to the Act. The Court also
held that the non-profit organization lacked prudential standing because they failed to allege that
Congress conferred to similarly situated organizations a private right of action to contest
discrimination regarding this claim. In dicta, the Court further stated that even if there were such
a statute conferring a private right of action, the non-profit organization would not satisfy
standing requirements because only a small minority of its membership comprised of lowincome individuals seeking residence in Penfield.
In dissent, the liberals of the Court argued poignantly that the majority used standing to
determine which litigants could gain access to the courts. Justice Douglas writes:
“Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as ‘the
political question’ was in earlier decades. The mounting caseload of federal courts
is well known. But cases such as this one reflect festering sores in our society, and
the American dream teaches that, if one reaches high enough and persists, there is
a forum where justice is dispensed. I would lower the technical barriers and let the
courts serve that ancient need. They can, in time, be curbed by legislative or
constitutional restraints if an emergency arises.
We are today far from facing an emergency. For, in all frankness, no
Justice of this Court need work more than four days a week to carry his burden”
(422 U.S. at 518).
Justice Brennan further argues that the majority’s decision premised on standing is
pretext for not only avoiding rendering a decision on the merits, but also for obscuring the
majority’s disdain for the plaintiffs’ claim. He writes:
“While the Court gives lip service to the principle, oft repeated in recent
years, that ‘standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention
that particular conduct is illegal,’ … in fact, the opinion, which tosses out of court
almost every conceivable kind of plaintiff who could be injured by the activity
claimed to be unconstitutional, can be explained only by an indefensible hostility
to the claim on the merits.
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In effect, the Court tells the … plaintiffs they will not be permitted to
prove what they have alleged … because they have not succeeded in breaching,
before the suit was filed, the very barriers which are the subject of the suit” (422
U.S. at 520).
The dissents of Justices Douglas and Brennan illustrate that the liberals of the Court
believed that the conservative majority used the threshold issue of prudential standing to bar
litigants from asserting their claims because they disparaged low-income and minority plaintiffs
seeking residence in a suburb. This case provides anecdotal evidence that the Supreme Court
used standing to control access by dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of prudential
standing. This case leads to my final research question: Do courts use the doctrine of prudential
standing to control access? As the Supreme Court controls its judicial agenda by certiorari
review (see Epstein, Segal and Victor 2002), I argue that federal circuit courts transform their
appellate jurisdiction by deciding cases on the threshold ground of prudential standing in order to
set their judicial agendas.
Previous chapters of this dissertation examine how courts control access by rendering
decisions on jurisdictional and procedural threshold issues. Chapters two and three examined
how federal circuit courts decide procedural rules and jurisdictional certification issues to control
which type of litigants gain access to their courts. This chapter focuses on how federal circuit
courts use the threshold issue of prudential standing to control access to the courts. Prudential
standing is defined as the federal courts’ ability to deny standing to a litigant to sue pursuant to a
Congressional statute. While federal courts use of standing is traditionally seen as unfettered
power because justiciable issues are conferred pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution,
federal courts are constrained when they employ the doctrine of prudential standing because
Congress can confer standing by statute. Through the common-law doctrine of prudential
standing, courts can deny standing to litigants; however, Congress can confer standing to a class
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of litigants when the court denies standing to such litigants. Pursuant to the doctrine of prudential
standing, federal courts’ discretion is curbed if Congress decides to confer standing to a class of
plaintiffs. If Congress is silent, courts can decide whether to confer standing to a class of
litigants. This principle is illustrated in Warth v. Seldin, where the conservatives of the court
availed themselves of the opportunity to bar access to the courts to low-income and racial
minorities in the absence of an expressed Congressional intent. Although this principle is
illustrated in a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal circuit courts also decide issues
pertaining to prudential standing.
In this chapter, I theorize that federal circuit courts decide issues of prudential standing
according to their policy preferences to control litigants’ access to the courts. I argue that federal
courts are also aware, however, of potential Congressional retaliation and federal circuit court
panels are constrained based on changes in the ideology of Congress. If courts stray too far from
the preferences of Congress, courts invite retaliation which could curb their discretion in terms of
conferring prudential standing. Thus, while circuit court judges seek to have their policy
preferences enacted into law, they are also constrained by the preferences of Congress. In this
chapter, I first discuss justiciability and its subset of Article III standing and prudential standing.
Next, I provide a review of empirical scholarship examining justiciability and, in particular,
standing. I then discuss my theory and hypotheses. Finally, I test my theory by examining the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, which was enacted to provide a private right of action to victims of
discrimination in the housing market and discuss the implications of my results.

69

4.2

Federal Courts and the Doctrine of Justiciability
Article III provides little guidance in the nature, power and role of the federal judiciary.

Clause 1 of Section 2 of Article III provides:
“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, … -- to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party; -- to controversies between two or more
states; -- between a state and citizens of another state; [and] --between citizens of
different states....”
Note that Article III states that federal courts have the power to adjudicate all “cases” and
“controversies.” However, the Constitution does not define “cases” or “controversies.” Ironically
a clause limiting the power of federal courts leaves it to these same courts to interpret those
provisions granting them this power of adjudication.
Courts have interpreted the power to adjudicate “cases” and “controversies” as the court’s
ability to provide relief to a plaintiff seeking redress from an injury (Gottlieb 1994). Federal
courts have limited their power by devising a number of mechanisms defining which causes of
action are justiciable (Pushaw 2003). Paramount is the court’s inability to adjudicate a claim if
the litigant cannot demonstrate that they have a live case. From this doctrine, courts decline
jurisdiction over issuing advisory opinions, where a coordinate branch seeks a court’s opinion on
the constitutionality of an act. Furthermore, courts have developed the doctrine of ripeness,
denying jurisdiction when a litigant fails to assert an actual “controversy” when the litigant has
not yet suffered an injury or sues in anticipation of an injury that has not yet occurred or
matured. Courts will similarly decline to adjudicate a claim under the doctrine of mootness if the
relief the litigant seeks has already been obtained. Another issue that courts have rendered
nonjusticiable is a political question. Pursuant to this doctrine, a court will decline to adjudicate a
claim if the political branches of government are better suited to resolve the dispute.
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4.3

Legal Analysis Examining Article III Standing and Prudential Standing
Standing is one of the most commonly adjudicated doctrines of justiciability. Justice

O’Connor, in Allen v. Wright (1984), defines standing as follows:
“In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. Standing
doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s
legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a
plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
The requirement of standing, however, has a core component derived directly
from the Constitution. A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief” (468 U.S. 737, 750-51) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Beyond Article III standing, Congress has specified that certain litigants have standing to sue
pursuant to an expressed grant conferred by statute, i.e., statutory standing. However, there is a
class of cases where Congress fails to specify whether litigants have standing to sue to enforce a
statutory provision, what is termed prudential standing. With prudential standing, courts must
determine Congress’s intent when a statute does not state whether a private right of action exists
to enforce the statute.6
Under prudential standing, courts apply a “zone of interest test” to determine whether
Congress intended to confer a private right of action to bring a lawsuit (see Hazardous Waste
Treatment v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975)). Courts make a determination of whether the statute created an injury within the
plaintiff’s “zone of interest” that Congress sought to protect. When a court denies a litigant

6

Courts have also applied the doctrine of prudential standing to common-law cases. However, this chapter focuses
on the statutory component to prudential standing.
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standing based on prudential considerations, Congress can subsequently override the decision of
the court and confer standing to the class of litigants (Fletcher 1988).
Prudential standing is best illustrated under the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).7 Under Section 5 of the APA, Congress can confer standing to citizens to
enforce administrative agencies to carry forth Congressional intent, such as the Clean Water Act
(Fletcher 1988). Absent Congressional expressed intent, courts must determine whether a private
right of action exists to enforce a statute.
Section 5 U.S.C. 702 of the APA provides, in pertinent part:
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof. … Nothing herein
(1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to
dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or
(2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”
Practically, Congress has given federal courts power to interpret statutes to determine if a
private right of action exists for enforcing provisions to further Congressional intent regarding
regulations governing the actions of administrative agencies.
There is a difference between constitutional standing from prudential standing on the
grounds that constitutional standing is conferred pursuant to Article III affording courts with
wide discretion in determining standing. As scholars note (Gottlieb 1994; Ho and Ross 2010)
Article III standing cannot be modified by the courts or Congress. However, prudential standing
is a creation of the courts where judges have discretion to grant or deny standing to litigants.
Congress can then confer standing when courts have denied standing to such litigants (Gottlieb

7

For a brief discussion of the APA, see Chapter 2.
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1994). If a court finds that a plaintiff has prudential standing, the plaintiff must satisfy the
requirements of Article III standing (Fletcher 1988).
4.4

The Fair Housing Act
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to prevent discrimination against

minorities in the residential housing market (Kushner 1991). The Act conferred a private right of
action to sue for discrimination on the basis of race, color and national origin in leasing and
purchasing of residences (Armstrong 1991). The Act now covers discrimination on the basis of
other protected classes, such as gender and disability. The purpose of the Act is to curb
discriminatory practices that perpetuated de facto segregation by prohibiting various
discriminatory practices such as redlining, where financial institutions offer higher interest rates
to buyers seeking to purchase in minority neighborhoods; discriminatory appraisals, where a
prospective homeowner is discriminated against on the basis of their race or on the basis of the
racial composition of a neighborhood which they are seeking to purchase a home; racial steering,
where realtors “steer” prospective minority buyers to neighborhoods of similar racial
composition; and exclusionary zoning, where municipalities deny zoning to contractors seeking
to build multifamily dwellings (Prakash 2013, 1459). The Act also prohibits discrimination in
transactions associated with the purchasing or leasing of a residence, which ranges from lending,
insuring, and advertising. There are three methods of enforcing the Fair Housing Act. The
Attorney General has authority to enforce the Act and file suit against violators. However, the
primary means of enforcement are lawsuits by persons who allege some violation committed
against them under the Act (Schwemm 1988). In 1988, Congress amended the Fair Housing Act
to provide private litigants with a greater incentive to file suit. The amended Act removed a
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$1,000 cap on punitive damages and removed the requirement of a plaintiff being financially
indigent in order to win an award of an attorney’s fee (Kushner 1989).
4.5

Courts and the Ideological Application of the Doctrine of Standing
Legal scholars have long argued that courts have used the doctrine of standing to control

litigant access to the courts. These scholars, using primarily qualitative and anecdotal accounts,
argue that Justices Frankfurter and Brandeis created the doctrine of standing to avoid judicial
determination on New Deal legislation (Winter 1988; Sunstein 1988; Ho and Ross 2009). These
justices, fearful of a conservative majority devised standing to allow states to experiment with
liberal legislation (Winter 1988, 1456). Stearns (1995) argues that the Supreme Court used
standing as a mechanism to control lower federal courts’ ability to render decisions on the merits
that invalidated New Deal legislation. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the APA conferred
standing to various agencies and the government, but did not confer such standing to the
beneficiaries of agency action (Sunstein 1988). This jurisprudence provided that plaintiffs had
standing to sue if an agency breached a duty owed directly to the plaintiff. Courts’ application of
this doctrine limited lawsuits challenging various laws, which protected many New Deal
regulations. Accordingly, progressive courts limited standing to shield administrative agencies
from potential lawsuits challenging New Deal regulations. Courts granted standing after
Congress began to confer standing by statute, indicating an expressed Congressional intent to
monitor agency action. Liberal courts then recognized that Congressional intent was carried
forward when litigants had the ability to sue when agencies failed to carry forward their
Congressional mandate. Liberal courts reasoned that Congress desired to protect the interests of
those whom the statute sought to protect (Ho and Ross 2010). Even though Congress amended
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the APA in 1946 to confer standing to litigants who suffered an injury, the general provision left
room for judicial discretion and ideological interpretation (Sunstein 1988).
Although there is a rich legal literature examining qualitatively judges’ use of their
ideology in issues addressing questions of standing, few empirical analyses exist. Among those
is Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002), who provide summary statistics regarding standing decisions
of the Supreme Court. They characterize standing decisions in terms of the Court granting access
to its doors. Particularly, they surveyed cases from 1953 to 2000 in which the Supreme Court
questioned a litigant’s standing to sue. They find that the Warren Court conferred standing in
68.9 percent of its cases, while the Burger and Rehnquist Courts held that plaintiffs had standing
in 42.7 and 38.6, respectively (2002, 233). However, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
standing in only a small number of cases. Within the terms they examined, only 174 cases within
that period addressed standing. Of those 174, the Court held that the litigant lacked standing in
90 cases. Only limited conclusions can be drawn from these preliminary statistics. Using a
multivariate regression, Ho and Ross (2010) find evidence that as the ideological composition of
the Supreme Court changes, the majority granted or denied standing to litigants who shared their
ideological preferences.
Other scholars have conducted empirical work regarding standing decisions in lower
federal courts. Staudt (2004) finds that policy preferences impact standing decisions in
examining cases involving taxpayer standing to challenge governmental expenditures in federal
courts at all levels of the judicial hierarchy. Regarding circuit courts, she finds that only the party
of the president of circuit court judges is statistically significant in decisions to confer standing to
taxpayers seeking to challenge a state law. Pierce (1999) finds that Republican judges are more
likely than Democratic judges to deny standing to plaintiffs asserting environmental claims.

75

However, Pierce primarily employs a legal analysis and empirically does not control for
independent variables. Fleisher (2007) used empirics to examine standing decisions for the D.C.
Circuit Court panels finding no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of
conservative and liberal panels dismissing a case on standing grounds. Rowland and Todd (1991)
study the influence of ideology on standing decisions of federal district court judges. They find
that the ideology of the judge impacts standing decisions. Judges who were appointed by
President Reagan were slightly less likely to confer standing to litigants classified as
“underdogs” than Carter-appointed judges. Moreover, Braman (2006) finds experimental
evidence that legally-trained participants acting as federal district court judges considered the
merits of a case when rendering a decision to confer standing to conform to their own ideological
preferences. Rendering a judgment on a threshold issue as opposed to the merits of a case thus
provides an opportunity to effect the outcome without reaching the merits. Scholars have studies
Article III standing, but the scholarship examining prudential standing is quite sparse. Warshaw
and Wannier (2011) find evidence that circuit courts are more likely to confer standing to the
beneficiaries of the environmental regulation than the industries who are regulated. They find
that Democratic-appointed circuit panels were more likely deny standing to businesses seeking
standing in cases involving environmental regulation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992). However, public law scholars have yet to provide substantial
empirical analyses regarding federal courts’ use of standing decisions and access control. As my
contribution, I offer a theory and testable hypotheses to address this gap in the literature.
4.6

Theory and Hypotheses
In previous chapters, I argue federal circuit courts use threshold issues to grant or deny

access to the courts for certain plaintiffs to control their judicial agendas. Just as circuit court
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panels use procedural and jurisdictional rules to control access to the courts, I argue that circuit
court panels use prudential standing to control who can gain access. Specifically, I theorize that
their decisions reflect their ideological predispositions, and prudential standing provides a
mechanism for judges to allow their favored litigants access to the courts while denying it to
those they disfavor. I test this theory in the context of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Prakash
(2013) argues that the conservative courts use the threshold issue of prudential standing to bar
minority plaintiffs seeking relief from discrimination pursuant to the Act. However, she does not
empirically test this claim. I test whether circuit courts use prudential standing requirements to
control which parties can gain access to the courts to bring a private right of action pursuant to
the Fair Housing Act. As explicated in previous chapters, I expect that federal circuit courts are
responsive to Congressional preferences. Congress can pass legislation conferring standing to
litigants when federal courts deny them prudential standing. I therefore argue that circuit courts
are constrained by Congressional ideology because those courts do not desire to render decisions
outside of Congressional preferences. They are fearful of such retaliation because it limits federal
circuit courts’ ability to set their own judicial agendas.
Scholars have concluded that conservatives are more likely to deny access to plaintiffs
who are either minorities or asserting rights on the behalf of minorities (Prakash 2013; Segal and
Spaeth 2002; Epstein and Knight 1997). The dissenters in Warth argued that the conservative
majority use the threshold issue of prudential standing as a pretext for denying litigants access to
the courts to litigate their claim on the merits. However, the majority’s position and the
dissenters provide only anecdotal evidence of the majority’s motive. Although the hypothesis I
test does not seek to ascertain the motive of the justices, I seek to explain the outcome of their
behavior. Therefore, my second hypothesis is as follows:
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H1: Conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to deny plaintiffs prudential
standing when seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act.
As hypothesized in previous chapters, federal courts may use threshold issues as a
mechanism to control their caseloads (Willging et al. 1996). Also, scholars have argued that
federal courts develop and increasingly use the doctrine of standing to control the caseload of
federal courts. As the APA created new potential causes of action, federal courts attempt to
control access to manage the increase in caseload (Fletcher 1988). Federal courts may be more
likely to dispose of cases based on a threshold issue in order to reduce their caseload. Therefore,
my second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: As the caseload of the circuit increases, the panel is more likely to deny prudential
standing.
Also, because Congress confers to groups of people prudential standing, I expect that
circuit court panels will respond to changes in Congressional ideology. However, any legislation
that seeks to change the standing status of litigants will be assigned to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees. Because the majority party sitting on those committees controls whether
legislation is voted out of committee, I measure the ideology of the majority party sitting on the
committee. Therefore, I expect that circuit panels are responsive to changes in these respective
committees.
H3: As the ideology of the majority party of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
become more conservative, the litigant seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act is less likely to
win.
Furthermore, as the chairs of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees act as
gatekeepers to any legislation assigned to the committee, the chair has the power to prevent
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legislation from reaching the chamber floor. Accordingly, I expect that circuit panels are
responsive to changes in the ideology of the chairs of these respective committees.
H4: As the ideology of the Chair of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees become
more conservative, the litigant seeking to enforce the Fair Housing Act is less likely to win.
4.7

Data and Methods
Data for this project was collected by reviewing cases published in Lexis/Nexis

Academic. Because the Fair Housing Act was passed in 1968, I coded cases from 1970 until
2000. I coded cases decided by panels sitting on the First through Eleventh Federal Courts of
Appeals and the D.C. Court of Appeals. I searched for all cases that included the terms
“standing” and “Fair Housing Act.” I coded a total of 96 cases. The dataset includes all published
and unpublished cases. I coded all cases where a party appealed the decision of the federal
district court that granted or denied the litigant prudential standing pursuant to the Fair Housing
Act.
My dependent variable is whether the litigant seeking standing to enforce the Fair
Housing Act won the appeal. I coded “1” if the pro-Fair Housing Act litigant won and “0” if that
litigant lost. My independent variables include the caseload of the federal courts. I measure
caseloads by the number of cases that were terminated per year by panel for each circuit. My
independent variables also include the median ideology of the circuit court panel. As in previous
chapters, I used the Giles, Hettinger, and Pepper nominate scores (Giles et al. 2001) to measure
the ideology of circuit court judges and the scores developed by Christina Boyd to measure
district court judges for those who sat on circuit court panels by designation (Boyd 2010). I
controlled for the Supreme Court by using the median judicial common space score for the
Court.
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I also controlled for the influence of Congress and the President by using the median
Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores for the House and Senate Judiciary Committees,
their Chairs, and the President. For all of these independent variables, I measured the ideological
distance of the panel from the median ideology of the circuit, the Supreme Court, the
Congressional variables, and the President. I use a probit analysis as the dependent variable is
dichotomous. Also, I use robust standard errors clustered on circuit to account for the possibility
that residuals may not be independent within each circuit. Thus, my model is as follows:
Standing = β0 + β1 Panel Ideology + β2 Circuit Median + β3 Supreme Court
+ β4 House Judiciary Committee + β5 Senate Judiciary Committee + β6 House
Chair + β7 Senate Chair + β8 President + β9 Caseload + ε
4.8

Results and Discussion
The summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Table 8: Summary Statistics

Variable
Pro-FHA Party
Panel Ideology
Circuit Median
Supreme Court
House Party Cmt
Senate Party Cmt
House Cmt Chair
Senate Cmt Chair
President
Caseload

Mean
.56
-.013
.061
.088
-.150
-.029
-.224
.083
.182
745

Standard Dev.
.50
.296
.253
.073
.348
.370
.348
.345
.544
272

Minimum
0
-.543
-.377
-.106
-.505
-.439
-.505
-.47
-.532
234

Maximum
1
.581
.581
.210
.313
.431
.313
.407
.693
2101

The summary statistics show that the pro-Fair Housing Act litigant wins at a relatively
high rate for an appeal; the pro-Fair Housing Act won the appeal at a rate of 56 percent. The
summary statistics provide some evidence that pro-Fair Housing Act litigants are not at a
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disadvantage when seeking standing to enforce the provisions of the Act. The summary statistics
also show that the median ideology of circuit court panels is slightly negative, with the median
ideologies of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court being slightly positive. Additionally, the
median ideologies of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and the majority party of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees are slightly negative, indicating that conservatives
controlled these committees. The results of the model are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Probit Model of the Pro-FHA Litigant Winning
Table 9: Probit Model of the Pro-FHA Litigant Winning

Variable
Panel Ideology
Circuit Median
Supreme Court
House Judiciary Cmt
Senate Judiciary Cmt
House Chair
Senate Chair
President
Caseload
Constant
N=94

Coefficient
-.704
.750
-2.027
19.979*
-11.285*
-15.717*
-2.326
10.531*
.001
2.472
χ 2 = 34.07

Standard Error
(.535)
(1.089)
(3.815)
(8.904)
(5.082)
(5.689)
(2.778)
(3.625)
(.001)
(1.645)
* = p > .05

I find support for the hypothesis regarding the ideology of the Chair of the House
Judiciary Committee. As the ideological distance of the Chair becomes more conservative in
relation to the circuit court panel, the pro-Fair Housing Act litigant is less likely to win. I also
find support for the hypothesis regarding the ideological effects of the majority party of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. It seems that panels heed to changes in the ideology of the majority
party of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Panels may be particularly responsive to changes in the
Senate Judiciary Committee since they hold confirmation hearings for presidential nominees to
the Supreme Court. However, the coefficient for the majority party of the House Judiciary
Committee is significant, but positively signed. This indicates that as the majority party of the
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House Judiciary Committee becomes more liberal, the panel is less likely to confer standing to
the pro-FHA litigant. This finding is the opposite of my expectations as I expect that panels
would be more not less likely to confer standing as it became more liberal. Panels could not be
concerned with changes within that Committee’s ideology. Alternatively, these results must be
taken with precaution as these variables are highly collinear. The presence of multicollinearity
can lead to a Type II error, which introduces the possibility of accepting a hypothesis that is false
(Gujaradi and Porter 2009).
Furthermore, the results indicate that I cannot reject the null hypotheses for Hypotheses 1
and 2. Although I do not find support for the hypothesis of the effects of the panel’s ideology, the
coefficient for this hypothesis is signed in the expected direction. Although signed in the
expected direction, it appears that the ideology of the circuit panel has no effect on the decision
to deny or grant prudential standing.
4.9

Conclusion
I find little support for my theory that federal circuit courts use the threshold issue of

prudential standing to control their appellate jurisdiction to set their judicial agendas. However, I
find support that panels are responsive to Congressional preferences. Circuit panels may not use
prudential standing to set its judicial agenda because prudential standing may sufficiently
constrain panels’ preferences. The threat of Congress conferring standing to a group of litigants
may cause panel to refrain from deciding cases in accordance with their ideological preferences.
This may lend support for Fix and Randazzo’s (2010) theory that courts render decisions on
threshold issues to avoid reaching the merits of a case because they desire to defer to the political
branches of government. Future research should explore why federal circuit courts do not use
prudential standing in this regard. Also, future research should also explore the circumstances
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that Congress will enact a statute conferring prudential standing when federal circuit courts have
previously denied such standing.
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5 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I explicate a theory arguing that federal circuit courts transform their
discretionary appellate jurisdiction into one that is mandatory to set their judicial agendas.
Particularly, I argue that federal circuit courts achieve this goal by deciding cases on threshold
grounds to control which litigants gain access to the courts. Circuit courts control access by
avoiding the merits of a case when they render decisions on threshold grounds. When a court
decides a case on threshold grounds, the court never adjudicates the merits of a litigant’s claim.
Consequently, the litigant will never obtain redress from the alleged grievance. Furthermore, a
higher court will never review the merits of the claim because the circuit court never renders a
decision on its merits.
Circuit courts can set their agendas by systematically dismissing cases that are
incongruent with their policy preferences. That is, courts use the status of the party as a heuristic
to determine whether their preferences are aligned with the appellant’s position. My findings
tend to show that conservative circuit courts are more likely than liberal circuits to dismiss a case
on threshold grounds when the litigant is an individual or plaintiffs seeking certification of a
class. If the ideology of the court were not a factor, conservative courts would be just as likely as
liberal courts to dismiss their cases on threshold grounds. However, my findings support the
former notion. Because my findings show that conservative circuit courts tend to punish
individual litigants, this has the effect of barring similarly situated litigants from “having their
day in court.” Consequently, all litigants do not have equal access to the courts.
I also set forth a theory arguing that federal circuit courts act strategically when deciding
threshold issues. As Epstein, Segal and Victor (2002) argue that justices of the Supreme Court
seek to invite less scrutiny by acting strategically at the agenda-setting stage than the merits
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stage, I likewise argue that federal circuit courts seek to invite less scrutiny at their agendasetting stage than at the merits stage. Because of this, I argue that federal circuit courts are
keenly aware of Congressional preferences and seek to decide cases within the confines of those
preferences.
I examine three types of threshold issues for this dissertation: procedural, jurisdictional,
and justiciable. In Chapter 2, I discuss how federal circuit courts control access by deciding cases
involving procedural rules. Federal courts have this power because they not only create the
Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, but also interpret those Rules in conformance with their
ideological preferences. I explicate my theory by examining Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides grounds for sanctioning parties and attorneys for filing frivolous
lawsuits. I find that conservative panels are more likely than liberal panels to rule against
individual litigants appealing the grant or denial of a Rule 11 sanction. The implications of this
finding are important because adverse decisions against individual litigants can have a
substantially chilling effect on their decision to file lawsuits in conservative circuits. I also find
support that circuit panels are responsive to Congressional preferences, particularly the
preferences of the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee. Evidence finding that circuit panels
are responsive to Congressional preferences lends support to my theory that the open rulemaking
process of the Rules Enabling Act is a sufficient mechanism to constrain the preferences of
circuit court panels. Because interest groups can “sound the alarm” when circuit panels stray too
far from Congressional preferences, circuit panels decide cases within the preferences of the
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee in order to avoid retaliation from Congress.
In Chapter 3, I discuss how federal circuit courts use jurisdictional issues to set their
judicial agendas by controlling access to the courts. A federal court must have jurisdiction over a
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party to adjudicate their claim. I test my theory by examining decisions on motions seeking class
certification in class action litigation. Unlike my finding regarding procedural rules, I find that
the ideology of the panel does not affect the likelihood that a panel will grant a motion seeking
class certification. However, I do find that the ideology of the circuit has a significant effect on
certification decisions. This may be a result of more stringent standard of review governing
certifications in conservative circuits. That is, conservative circuits have set forth a standard of
review for class certification to render it more difficult for panels to decide certification decisions
in conformance with their ideology. Also, this finding provides support that conservative circuit
courts seek to discourage class action lawsuits, as the evidence from Coffee and Paulovic (2007)
suggests. However, Congress controls the jurisdiction of the federal courts and, therefore,
controls which litigants can bring lawsuits in federal court. This includes decisions governing
certification of class action lawsuits. However, my findings do not support the theory that circuit
panels are constrained by Congressional preferences. The lack of an open process like the Rules
Enabling Act may explain why circuit courts are not responsive to Congressional preferences.
In Chapter 4, I examine whether circuit courts control their agendas by determining that
litigants lack prudential standing to bring their claims into court. Federal courts have power to
deny prudential standing when Congress is silent regarding whether litigants have a private right
of action to enforce a provision of a Congressional statute. I argue that federal courts use this
power to control which litigants gain access to the courts. I test my theory by examining
decisions to grant or deny prudential standing to litigants seeking enforcement of the Fair
Housing Act of 1968. However, my findings do not support the notion that federal circuit courts
use the doctrine of prudential standing to control which litigants gain access to the courts. I also
expect that Congressional preferences influence circuit court decisions because Congress has the
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power to confer standing when a federal court denies prudential standing to a class of litigants.
My findings provide some support for this expectation. I find that circuit panels are more likely
to deny prudential standing as the majority party of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee become more conservative. However, my findings
regarding the majority party of the House Judiciary Committee do not conform to my
expectations. These findings may show that the ideology of circuit panels is constrained by
Congressional preferences. However, these results must be taken with precaution as the
Congressional variables are highly collinear.
In conclusion, I argue that federal circuit courts transform their mandatory appellate
jurisdiction to one that is discretionary to set their judicial agendas. I find support for my theory
that federal circuit courts seek to set their agendas by controlling which litigants gain access to
the courts. I find evidence that federal circuit courts use jurisdictional issues to control access in
decisions to certify a class. The strongest support for this notion is discussed in my chapter
examining procedural rules. Unlike jurisdictional and justiciable issues, federal circuit courts
have power to promulgate procedural rules and render decisions interpreting those rules
according to their policy preferences. Congress has structured this rulemaking process to allow
ideologically aligned interest groups to “sound the alarm” when federal court preferences stray
too far from Congressional preferences. Similar effects are not evident the chapter examining
jurisdiction and those effects are questionable in the chapter examining justiciability. This may
lend evidence that an open process is a necessary to constrain the ideological preferences of the
federal circuit panels.
The implications of these findings are important. Because circuit courts practically serve
as the court of last resort for the vast majority of appellants, they have little recourse when a
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circuit court denies them access. Particularly, if conservative panels are more likely to rule
against individuals, then individuals could be deterred from filing lawsuits. Moreover, this
provides circuit panels with great power to control their judicial agendas. If circuit courts are
successful in using threshold issues to control which cases it chooses to hear, it can
systematically choose to hear cases at the merits stage and render decisions that maximize their
policy goals. If circuit courts can achieve this goal, they are able to set their judicial agendas in a
similar manner as the U.S. Supreme Court set its agenda by certiorari review.
I plan to continue my research examining how federal circuit courts set their agendas in
this regard. In my dissertation, I study how circuit courts decide cases involving procedural rules
according to their policy preferences. In future work, I will examine how federal courts create
procedural rules according to their preferences and how these rules affect litigant access. Also, I
will explore the role of interest groups in the rulemaking process. As Scherer et al. (2008) find
that interest groups play an important role in the confirmation process of federal judges, I seek to
further understand the influence of interest groups in procedural rulemaking. Additionally, I will
further study the role legal doctrine has in constraining jurisdictional issues. As my findings
show that conservative circuit courts use jurisdictional issues of decisions to certify a class, I will
explore how circuit courts create legal doctrine to constrain panels’ decisions in class
certifications. Regarding prudential standing, I will investigate the conditions Congress retaliates
and confers standing when a federal court denies prudential standing to certain litigants.
My long-term research agenda expands beyond the study of federal circuit courts. As I
argue that federal circuit courts set their agendas by using threshold issue to control their
appellate jurisdiction, I will explore whether this phenomenon occurs within federal district
courts. If this occurs within federal district courts, litigants are totally barred from obtaining
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redress from any federal court. Also, I seek to explore state courts’ ability to set their agendas by
deciding cases on threshold grounds. As research has shown that state court selection systems
vary judicial outcomes (see Huber and Gordon 2004; Brace and Boyea 2008), I will explore
whether selection systems affect state courts’ ability to control their judicial agendas. In
conclusion, public law scholars can better understand the power of the courts to set their judicial
agendas by controlling access when rendering decisions on threshold grounds.
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